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I. SUMMARY
A. Purpose and Scope:
To identify, analyze and interpret domestic and world economic,
technological, political and social trends which may affect U,S. avia-
tion development and growth during the period 1980-2000.
B. Methodology:
Identification of key variables and trends and projections of
possible future environments based upon extrapolations of selected
quantifiable and qualitative variables.
C. Some Key Trends:
1. Development of some degree of weather control and/or climate
modification
2. Continuation of industrial development
3. Expansion of international trade and travel among the countries
of the Pacific Basin
4. Expanding role of multinational corporations
5. Short-term technological crises of various sorts
6. Alleviation of food shortages through development of improved
distribution systems and continuation of the "green revolution"
7. Continuation of the sunbelt shift in the U.S.--development of
South and Southwe•t.and relative decline of . parts of North and
North-Central U.S.
8. Continuing decline in the rate of U.S. and world population
growth
9. Continued growth of U.S. GNP, probably at about 3 percent
annually.
10. Continued availability of critical resources well into the next
century--no serious shortages developing
1.1. Development of adequate alternative energy sources by century's
end
.12. No major wars--no major peace. Defense spending continuing at
present levels, possibly rising over time if crises occur
iiv
D. Best Estimate of World Future:
Convinugd economic growth in West and accelerated industrialization
r+;''developing countries as multinational corporations grow and
expand operations abroad
Pacific Basin Growth sparked by Japan
Decline in World Energy Prices over time as oil production in non-
OPEC areas increases and use of coal and other substitutes expandsi
GNP Growth in U.S. and world continues, but at slightly slower pace
World Population Growth rate .turns downward and moves toward ultimate
stability, L;it population growth remains as problem in the year 2000
International Relations should stabilize as U.S.-S.U. relationship
normalizes
Few Radical Political Changes outside third and fourth worlds
.Development of Megalopolises in U.S. and developed world--sunbelt
shift continues
E. General Impact on_ Aviation:
Military -R&D will remain principal focus of R&D efforts.
U.S. will continue to dominate world aviation market.
U.S. will emphasize tactical air defense.
Major breakthroughs possible which could drastically alter military
posture; e.g.., V/STO.L.
Air _'Transport growth to continue at about 9 percent per year.
Emphasis on greater comfort, economy, efficiency., rather than speed
in new transport designs.
Civil- Aviation's market should steadily expand as world economies
grow.
vli.	 INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results : of a study of variables affecting
aviation in the United States during the last fifth of the twentieth
century. lts purpose is to present estimates of relevant future develop-
ments and identify their probable impact on the aviation industry in
this country. Toward this end, a series of key trends relating to
economic, social, political, technological, ecological and environmental
developments have been identified and are discussed with relation to
their possible effects on aviation. From this analysis a series of
scenarios has been developed representing an array of possibilities
ranging from severe economic depression and-high international tension
on the one hand to a wo,id of detente wnich enjoys an unprecedented
economic growth rate and relaxation of tensions on the other. A "sur-
prise free"* scenario is presented which represents our best judgment
to the manner in which events will most probably develop and the effect
on the aviation industry such developments will likely produce.
Projections of the future environment of an organization, or group
of organizations, like the aeronautical industry, depend upon extrapola-
tion of certain relatively predictable variables, such as envelope
curves for computer capacities, but also upon extrapolation of such
unstable social variables as lifestyles. Thus the unpredictabill.ty.of
key variables introduces enormous uncertainties into complex projections.
Second, and frequently more important, the environment can change because
of conscious policies, and those policies are frequently unpredictable.
Thus, it is impossible to provide any degree of certainty to projections
of most variables., it is impossible to generate a precise range of proba-
bilities for the major alternatives, and important variables always will
depend upon the vagaries of political decision. Nonetheless even among
complex social processes influenced by political decisions, there exist
relatively stable trends-because of long lead times for decisions to be
implemented and because those decisions have effects over still longer
periods of time. There is a common fallacy that quantifiable variables
are invariably easier to predict than qualitative variables, because we
have seemingly sophisticated methodologies for the projection of numer-
ical variables such as gross national product, population, or computer
capacity. In fact this is not so, because qualitative variables often
behave in much more stable fashion. Culture, values, lifes.tyles,.
national character, and other similarly difficult-to-quantify variables
frequently are much easier to predict because of their greater stability.
For example, a scholar writing in 1830, as de •Tocqueville did, would
find it much easier to predict the degree to which Americans . in 1975.
would emphasize democracy, achievement, egalitarianism, economic attain-
ment, and the rule of law as central values of their lives, than he
Although we always expect the future to bring surprises, the least-_
surprising scenario is clearly the "best estimate" for planning purposes.
See Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework.for
Speculation (New York: Macmillan) 1967.
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would to predict the population of the country in 1975. Moreover, the
rising sophistication of demographic projection techniques throughout
this century has not proved very successful at enhancing the accuracy
of middle- and long-range projections:
The report is organized into three basic sections; identification
of key trends, an examination of world futures growing from these, and
the possible impact on aviation growth of the projected developments.
Appended are detailed examinations of factors which may have particular
significance in future developments relating to aviation.
N
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Ill. KEY TRENDS
Demographic and Social Trends
Basic Values
The most stable social trends are those concerning basic values,
including fundamental views of the goals of life, the nature of the family,
and the nature of society. Basic values do change, for instance as a
series of generations move from being peasants to being urban workers to
being middle class businessmen to being upper middle class professionals.
But the values-of classes and of whole societies change very slowly indeed.
In recent years semi-popular literature has arisen suggesting that the
U.S. and the world are undergoing fundamental changes of values away from
middle class economic striving and toward "Consciousness.IlE" or "quality
of life" or "steady-state" or even "hippy culture." But the fundamental
fact is that most of the population of the United States remains solidly
cn.mmitted to classical middle class economic striving as the basic way
of life. In other industrialized countries the commitment to this classic
style of life is even more profound, because these other countries have
not yet attained the material levels, and the security of prosperity,
which is a prerequisite of the shift to non-economic values. The current
world recession demonstrates vividly how profound the commitment to these
economic values remains, and how threatened the industrialized world
becomes when these values are threatened. Finally, and most important
of all, the vast majority of the world's people are lust entering the
initial phases of commitment to bourgeois values, and .as they taste the
first fruits of economic growth (riding bicycles instead of walking,,then
riding cars instead of bicycles) their commitment will intensify. Thus
the most profound global trend in basic values is movement into middle
class economic striving, not movement away from it, and the consequence
will be worldwide pressures for economic growth, for the communications
and transport systems upon which such growth depends, and for the consumer
goods and tourism that are the fruits of such growth.
Super-industrial Society
The structural economic consequence of this rising pressure of
economic striving will be what we call the super-industrial society.
The phrase "super-industrial" refers here to both the scale and the
scope of technology. In super-industrial society the scale of technology
rises to the point where the U.S. space program, the million ton tanker,
and the trillion dollar Japanese infrastructure development plan become
economically and technologically feasible. Likewise, in super-industrial
society the scope of industrial society spreads from the currently
industrialized.countries until it covers most or all of the world. The
continued rise of the super-7n , Iustrial society carries with it rising
affluence for humanity, rising ability of man to control nature and his
own destiny, and also the problems of pollution, resource bottlenecks
and scarcity, and loss of nerv;a,.all of which are concomitants of the
positive achievements.
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Thy: rise of the super-industrial society brings with it a rising
shift from primary extractive industries and secondary manufacturing
industries into service industries. (See Fig. 1.) The service Indus-
tries require different styles of work and stimulate different habits
of mind than the earlier forms of human labor, and thus the-, make pos-
sible certain shifts of attitudes and values. Societies in which
services have become the employers of most of the population have come
to be labeled post-industrial_ societies, and it is fair to label some
of their associated values as post-industrial values. Thus, as societies
become affluent and educated, more and more people concern themselves
with non-economic values, emphasizing "quality of life" rather than
"standard of living."
These latter emphases, and the rising ability of the affluent to
choose among alternative lifestyles rather than simply grinding away at
manufacturing jobs, have given rise to the literature on the passing of .
middle class economic values. But what this literature sometimes forgets
is how tiny a proportion of U.S. and global population really possesses
these new values and choices. In the most affluent lands past-industrial
society .does not replace super-industrial society; rather, it depends
upon the super-industrial society and coexists with it as a tiny, rather
isolated pocket of post-economic values. And for the vast mass of
humanity, industrial society and middle class values constitute an
optimist.i.c view of the future rather than an obsolete civilization. The
most outstanding example of this upward thrust of much of the world into
industrial civilization is the phenomenon Hudson Institute has labeled
the rise .of the Pacific Basin. This example is discussed in detail under
International Trade.
r
3Technology Related Crises
Although we project long-term growth, and the continuing emergence
of the super-industrial society, sbnrt-term setbacks may occur, or
crises of great importance may make fairly seriioua alterations in the
patterns and rates of growth. More fundamentally, the rise of the super-
industrial society ensures that mistakes, as well as successes, will be
of great magnitude. Massive pollution, nuclear accidents, culturing and
release of mutated viruses, and other disasters become possible in the
super-industrial society, as do political explosions resulting from
competition to take advantage of the new opportunities opened up by
technology--for instance, new opportunities to exploit the seabed. Some
of the possible crisez are listed in Table III on "1985 Technological
Crises," the name of which is taken from von Neumann's famous article
predicting that 1985 would see the rise of crises of excessively large-
scale technology."
A second kind of crisis can also have important consequences for
high-technology organizations. This second kind of crisis occurs not
in the super-industrial states, but in the emerging industrial states.
Wherever health technology has outrun food technology and other forms
of economic development, great masses of poor and sometimes starving
people result, and when this happens the post-industrial world focuses
its attention on the crisis and comes to regard high technology and dis-
pensible post-industrial programs as "frivolous." And even in the super-
industrial, post-industrial parts of the world, whenever recession or
crime or power shortages or some other social phenomenon threatens basic
middle class comforts, attention focuses on the immediate ctisl.s; post-
industrial esthetics and super-industrial triumphs become expendable.
0- sire  for Land
Only slightly less predictable than the overall, worldwide pressure
for continued growth, and at least as predictable as the continuation of
such trends as Pacific Basin takeoff, are certain basic demographic pat-
terns. In the U.S., suburbanization is such a pattern. suburbanization
derives from a deeply ingrained American desire for living space--as shown
in Tables I and 11. Although sometimes characterized by those who dislike.
it as a relatively ephemeral phenomenon of "flight from the cities" or as
a consequence of certain post-World War 11 government policies, subu:--
banization dates back to colonial times. Continued suburbanization will
lead to the formation of vast megalopolises, such as those Kahn and Wiener
called in The Year 2000 (op.cit) "San-San" and "Boswash." Contiruing
suburbanization is facilitated by various economic and technological
trends, including improved communications, the rise of a service economy,
and the vitality of electronics and other industries which do not require
large factories, because these trends facilitate the movement of work to
the suburbs and to quasi-rural areas.
These issues as well as those related to changing values are explored
by A. J. Wiener in "Faust's Progress Report; Technology, Changing Values,
and the Reactions Against Rationality," a draft report to the National
Endowment for the Humanities.
r
Itmo ciBILm Or' M
oldoINAL PAGE" IS IW
4Rural Migration--Re-Urbanization
This trend of work moving out of the central cities to where people
live should continue and accelerate. As a result the populations of the
centers of the biggest cities are not likely to rise. Because commuting
has become so time-consuming, satellite cities like White Plains, Fram-
ingham and San Jose will develop and prosper. For the same reason, many
of those who continue to work in the central cities will intensely desire
to live closer to their work, and as a result a vast rebuilding of the
residential areas of the central cities will soon begin to progress
rapidly. This phenomenon of white, upper middle class influx into, and
rebuilding of, formerly black, lower class areas has already begun to
occur in many of the largest cities, for instance in the Capitol area
of Washington, D.C. The formation of new ghetto areas should be greatly
reduced, because the plight of present inner cities was the consequence
of a vast migration that is now topping out--namely, the migration of
poor, black, uneducated Southerners from the low-welfare, poor--wage
states of the South to the comparatively high-welfare, high-wage cities
of the North and the coasts. Likewise, white migration from the rural
Table 11
THE DESIRE FOR LAUD
PREFER 1966 1960 1971 1972
CITY 22% 170 13%
SUBURB 28 26 26 31
SMALL TOWN 31 31 31 32
FARM 18 24 25 23
SOURCE: GALLUP POLLS
LIVE NOW PREFER
LARGE CITY OR SUBURB 27'; M.
MEDIUM SIZED CITY OR SUBURB 28 22
SMALL TOWN OR CITY 33 30
OPEN COUNTRY 12 34
100% 100%
i
5Table El
PREFER TO LIVE IN:
I n Pe rcen t
CITY SUBURBAN SMALL TOWN FARM
NATIONAL 17 26 31	 25
RACE
WHITE 16 27 31	 25
NON-WHITE 26 21 32	 20
EDUCATION
COLLEGE 17 33 32	 17
HIGH SCHOOL 16 26 32	 25
GRADE SCHOOL 17 20 29	 34
OCCUPATION
PROF.	 S BUS, I8 31 31	 20
WHITE COLLAR 18 32 32	 18
FARMERS 2 - 12	 86
MANUAL 14 27 33	 26
AGE
18-20 18 22 30	 30
21-29 13 28 30	 29
30-49 16 29 31	 23
50 r, OVER 19 24 33	 2A
RELIGION
PROTESTANT 13 24 31	 32
CATHOLIC 21 32 32	 15
OTHER (38) (25) (31)	 (	 4)
POLITICS
REPUBLICAN 19 24 33	 24
DEMOCRAT 17 27 32	 24
INDEPENDENT 13 28 3D	 28
REGION
EAST 18 32 33	 16
MID14EST 14 26 29	 31
SOUTH 17 21 29	 33
WEST 2e 26 35	 18
INCOME
$15.000 6 OVER 20 37 24	 18
510,000-514.999 15 30 33	 22
$ 7,000- q
 9.999 12 31 30	 26
S moo-S 6.999 14 22 36	 26
S 3,000-S 4.999 18 17 29	 36
UNDER $3,000 23 14 35	 28
COMMUNITY SIZE
1,00D.000 E OVER
500,000-999,999 27 44 17	 12
50,000-499,999 23 35 29	 12
2,500-	 491999 10 13 51	 26
UNDER 2,SO0, RURAL 2 15 31	 52
SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1971
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Table
	 III
1985 TECHNOLOGICAL CRISES
By 1985 the Following Areas are Likely 1.	 Intrinsically Dangerous Technology .
to Give Rise to Special Technologifml Dangers
A. Modern means of mass destruction
I.	 Intrinsically dangerous technology B. Nuclear reactors—fission or fusion
2.	 Gradual worldwide and/or national contamination or C. Nuclear explosives, high-speed gas centrifuges, etc,
degradation of the environment D. Research missiles, satellite Inunchers, commercial air-
:1.	 Spectacular and/or multinational contamination or degra- craft, etc.
dation of the environment E. Biological and chemical "progmss"
I.	 Dangerous internal political issues F. Molecular biology a-,-.d genetics
5..	 Upsetting international consequences G. "Mind control"
6.	 Dangerous personal choices H. New techniques for insurgency, criminality, terror or
7.	 Bizarre issues ordinary violence
1. New techniques for counterinsurgency or imposition
of order
J. New :u^rendipities and synergisms .
i
S.	 Upsetl-li-sg International Consequences
6
2. Gradual Worldwide and/or National Contamination
:3.	 Spectaicularand/or Multinational Contamination
or De r radatiion of the Environment
Nuclear war
Nuclear testing
Bacteriological and chemical war or accident
Artificial moons
Projects West Ford, Storm Fury, etc.
Supersonic transportation (shack waves)
Weather control
Big "geomorphological" projects
Million-ton tankers (Torre Canyon was only 111 ,825 tons)
And million-pound planes
Other enterprise or mechanism of "excessive" size
or Degradation of the Environment
A. Radioactive debris from various peaceful nuclear issues
B. Passible greenhouse or Other effects from Increased CO2
in the atmosphere, or new ice age because of dust in
stratosphere, etc.
C. Other spe^ial dangerous wastes.-methyl, mercury, DDT, etc. A.
D. Waste heat B.
E. ' Other less dangerous but environment degrading wastes C.
such as debris and garbage D.
F. Noise, ugliness and other annoying byprmductsof many E.
modern activities F.
G. Excessive urbanization G.
H. Facessive overcrowding H.
I. Excessive tourism I.
J. Insecticides, fertilizers,growth "chemicals," rood addi-
tives, plastic containers, rtc. J.
4.	 Dangerous Internal Political Issues
A	 Computerized records
B.	 Other computerIzed surveillance
C.Other advanced techniques for surveillance .
D. Excessively degradable (or unreliably reassuring) central-
ized capabilities
E. Improved knowledge of and techniques for agitprop and
i	 other means of creating disturbances
F. Improved knowledge of, and techniques for, preventing
disturbances
G. Complex or critical governmental issues leading to either
"technocracy" or "Camarlsm".
H. Nuclear weapons affecting Internal politics
I. Excessively illuslened attitudes
J. Other dangerous attitudes
A. Both new and" hnditional" demonstration effects
B. Technological obsolescence of "unskilled" labor
C. New synthetics-.e.g., coffee, oil, etc.
D. Forced modernization
E. Growing guilt feelings by many In weaithynations, . .
particularly among the alienated or young
F. Inexpensive and widely available "realistic" communica-
tlons and physical travel
G. Accelerated "brain drains"`
IL. Cheap (synthetic?) food
L	 Cheap education
J.	 Control and exploitation of the oceans. space, moon.
6.	 Dangerous Personal Choice¢
A. Sea: determination
B. Other genetic Engineering
C.. Psychedelic and maod -affeeting drugs
D. Electronic stimulation of plessun centers
E. Other method of sensual satisfaction
F. Excessive permissiveness and indulgence
G. Dropping out and other alienation
H. Excessive nareimim orothersahf -regard
I. Super.cosmetoIogy
J. Lengthy hibernation
7.	 Bizarre Issues
A. Generational changes; e.g., extended longevity
B. Mechanically dependent humans; e .g.,. pacemakers. .
C:.	 Life And death for . an Individual; e.g., artificial kidneys, etc.
D. New . forms of humanity; e,g.,"Ilve" computers
E. "Forcible" birth control for "Impossible" groups
F. Other external controls or influence on what should be a
personal or even institutionally private choice
G. Life and death or other. controlof "outlaw" societies which
have not yet committed any traditional crime
Ii. Even the continuation of the nation -state system
L	 Controlling and linrlting change and innovation
J.	 Radical ecological changes on a planetary scale
K Interplanetary. gontamination
7South to the North has ended, and black migration from the inner cities
of the North to northern suburbs is beginning and should accelerate
rapidly whenever the national economy is prospering.
Effect of Climate on Demography
The old movement of the poor from the South to the North is increas-
ingly being replaced by a new movement of the rich from the North to the
South, a. movement we call 'The Sunbelt Shift." (See Table IV.) The i
reasons for this movement include rising cultural emphasis on recreation
and informal leisure, increasing numbers of older people (who find the
South more healthful), and basic economic considerations having to do
with a . sh .ift from the 19th century industrial base centered an North-
eastern coal, steel, and. shipping, to employment increasingly dominated
by services and by light, high-technology manufacturing with Iow trans-
portation costs.
In addition to the personal and social benefits of good climate,
there are considerable economic benefits which are very important. Con-
struction can be undertaken year-round and building standards need not
be as severe.. Heating costs are lower, but are cancelled out by the
costs of air-conditioning. In many small ways the costs are lower.
People can wear fewer and cheaper clothes; medical bills are lower;
there are no snow clearance costs; cars last longer. Warm areas are
better places to be poor---a . substandard dwelling is less intolerable
when the temperature stays high. We believe 6,4t the benefits of living
in warmer climes will encourage a southerly migration for the remainder
of this century. At some time, probably not in the next decade, white
southbound migrants will be followed by the more prosperous non-whites.
Climate is +7uch more important than it was in the past because
people are relatively more important to our developing service economy
than are raw materials. The jobs go where people want . to be, ratifier
than vice versa. Road and air transport permit much more flexibility
in location than sea and rail did. Other technological changes permit-
ting movement toward leisure areas involve communications, medical
services and recreational vehicles.. Moreover, new resort areas have
been given widespread publicity.
Most of the rural areas and small towns of America are in decline,
but there are:many interesting exceptions which may herald a. strong
trend in the future. Certain areas which ought to.be  declining are
indeed prospering because they support great leisure activities. The 	 1
best example is the hilly areas of New England, which have been under--
going.outward migration for weil over a .century, yet in recent. years
have seen a reversal as farmers have been. replaced by increasing num-
bers of skiers. The same is true of the ex-mining communities of
Colorado and California. The farmer fishing and whaling communities
on Cape Cod have converted long ago to leisure use. Flourishing beach
areas throughout the country are other examples, as are the rapid
development of Florida and many desert areas of the Southwest. (See
Table V.) .
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Table IV
THE SUN BELT SHIFT
Urbnrfizod Areas over 1/2
Million Population
POPULATION
GROWTH
1950-70
AVERAGE
JANUARY
TEMPERATURE
RAPID GROWTH (OVER 100%)
Phoenix 300%
Miami 250 67
Sacramento 200 45
St. Petersburg 195 55
San Diego 177 56
Houston 137 Sh
Dallas 136 116
Atlanta 132 45
Los Angeles 123 54
Jacksonville 118 56
Norfolk 116 41
Denver 110 28
Oklahoma City 110 37
MODERATE GROITH _(50-100%)
Seattle 99% V
Hartford 97 26
Dayton 97 32
Washington 93 37
San Francisco 83 51.
Columbus AD 30
Twin Cities 73 12
Memphis 64 42
Indianapolis 63 29
Portland, Ore. 61 38
San Antonio 61 .50
Kansas City 58 32
Cleveland 55 28
Louisville 55 35
Milwaukee 51 21
:SLOW GROWTH (UNDER 500
Akron 48% 29
Rochester 47 25
New Orleans 46 55
Chicagn 4; 26
Detroit 44 .27
Springfield, Mass. 44 24
Philadelphia 38 12
Cincinnati 37 311
Baltimore 36. 35
New York 34
32
St. Louis 34 32
Providence 33 29
Birmingham 26 44
Boston 25 30
Buffelo. 21 25
Pittsburgh 20 29
9TOble V
U..S. REGIONAL POPULATION CHANGE
NET
MIGRATION
1950 1970 % CHANGE 60-70
(MILLIONS) (MILLIONS) 60-70 WHITE	 BLACK
.
.REGION.
NORTHEAST 39 49 10% -1%	 20%
MIDWEST 44 57 10% -3%	 1.1%
SOUTH 47 63 1'4% 4%	 -12%
WEST 20 39 24% 9%	 28%
NATION 151 205 13% -	 -
LARGE STATES
CALIFORNIA 11 20 27% 11%	 31%
NEW YORK 15 18 9% -4%	 28%
PENNSYLVANIA 10 12 20% -4%	 3%
TEXAS 8 11 17% 1%	 -
ILLINOIS 9 11 10% -2%	 12%
OHIO 8 11 10% -20	 6%
MICHIGAN 6 9 13% -20	 17%
NEW JERSEY 5 7 18% 6%	 23%
FLORIDA 3 7 37% 33%	 -4%
11ASSACHUSETTS 5 6 10% 1%	 30%
OTHER RAPID GROWING STATES SLOW GRO'41NG STATES
1960-70 CHANGE 1960-70 CHANGE
NEVADA 71% W.	 VIRGINIA -6%
ARIZONA 36% N. DAKOTA -2%
ALASKA 33s S. DAKOTA -2%
COLORADO 26% IDAHO 1%
MARYLAND 26% MISSOURI 2%
DELAWARE. 23% 1 O41A 2%
HAWAII 22% MISSISSIPPI 2%
VERMONT 22% KANSAS 3%
la
In addition, communities devoted to certain recreational facilities
may spring'.up within urban areas. We are already noticing small boating
communities around marinas. In the Midwest there is .a strong tradition
of"a cabin in the woods"for hunting, fishing, and getting away from it
all.
Generally, this is a favorable development: these leisure oppor-
tunities provide numerous service jobs for the local indigenous popula-
tion. The old inhabitants live off the new settlers. Note also the
long -history of summer resort areas within range of metropolitan areas
gradually being transferred from seasonal to permanent occupancy. As
the cities spread out, we may expect this process to continue. In our
surprise-free projection, these trends continue:
1. The sun belt shift--a continuing growth of most of the
warmer areas of the U.S.
2: Further growth of other quaternary
*
 areas--desirable places
because of their natural environment (e.g., the ski-belt
areas such as the Colorado Rockies, the California Sierras .
and Vermont; in general, the beach and lake areas), or
because of their cultural environment (e.g., San Francisco
and posh areas of Manhattan).
3. Growth of the Southern Piedmont--from the Shenandoah Valley
through the Carolina "ring city" and Atlanta to Nashville.
The area has an excellent climate, relatively good race
relations, increasingly better education, a fine labor
force, and a favorable attitude toward business
4. The development of Northern Florida--as Southern Florida
is filling up.
5. Development of the Pacific slope, which has good weather,
beaches and outdoor recreation.
6. The growth of Eastern Arizona and Western New Mexico,
spilling over from Southern California and Western Arizona.
7. The development of the Boston-to-Washington Piedmont'
fringe--from Maine down through West Virginia-- involving
very low density summer and ski homes, and more long-
distance commuting to :. major centers.
Quaternary means services to services and to other post-tertiary
economic activities,
r
11
8. The growth of state capitals: bi, employment centers as
state governments enlarge their functions.
9. Development of the Gulf Coast--through the dynamic economic
expansion of coastal Texas (especially Houston), and
Louisana. Cheap air conditioning makes the area more
pleasant; beaches and waterways make it desirable.
By comparison, we list below areas that are most likely to be
declining or stagnant.
10. Old ports: traditional shipbuilding and shipping are on
the way out. Only a few large deep-water ports will
maintain their current importance.
11. Old coal-and-iron areas (e.g., West Virginia, Pittsburgh,
Duluth). Even a major revival of coal mining will be
very capital-intensive and will require much less labor.
The peak of out-migration, though, is probably past, and
the old crisis may revive investment in some old coal
fields, as well as open many new ones.
12. The Great Plains--modern farming requires fewer farmers
per year. Most of those employed in "agriculture" will
work in factories making machinery and fertilizer.
13. The black belt of the South--the penetration of modern
mechanized farming into the rural South will displace
traditional labor. But white out-migration has already
ended and the rush of .black out-migration is also probably
over.
Table Vi summarizes our projections for regions and a few key
rapidly growing states.
Thus the demographic prospects for the United States over.the.next
quarter century are for greater spread, lower population densities,
decentralized industries, satellite cities, rebuilt inner cities, an
end to the vast migration of the poor from the rural South to the urban
North, and--as we have emphasized. elsewhere--accelerated migration of
the .relatively affluent from the cold North to the warmer southern
states. These projections are somewhat :sensitive to energy prices,
since the decentralized demographic pattern depends upon cheap trans-
portation, but as we shall argue below long-term energy prices are
likely to fall as low as pre-OPEC cartel prices.
World Populations. Trends
Another trend that tends to be relatively predictable, although far
less than the above, is world (or major country) population. It is
worth noting that past predictions of future. American population growth
i
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Table VI
REGIONAL POPULATION,°
MILLIONS
1975 1980 198.5
NEW ENGLAND 12.5 13.2 13.9
MIDDLE ATLANTIC (NY-VA.) 49.0 51.0 53.9
FLORIDA 7.5 8:3 8.9
REST OF SOUTH 33.4 34.5 35.6
MIDWEST	 (OHIO-MINN.) 53.9 56.0 59.6
PLAINS 7.6 7.8 8.1
TEXAS 1.2.0 12..8 13.6
SOUTHWEST (N.M.-NEV.) 3.6 3.9 4.2
COLORADO 2..4 2.6 2.8
REST OF MOUNTAINS (IDA-UTAH) 2.9 3.0 3.2.
:PACIFIC NORTHWEST 5.9 6.4 6.8
CALIFORNIA 22.1 24.2 26.4
HAWAII & ALASKA 1.1 1.2 1.3
TOTAL U.S. .213.9 224.9 238.3
Source: Hudson Institute projections from U.S. Bureau of
the Census data.
	 i
have generally turned out very poorly. However, demographic knowledge
Is improving. Certain of the discontinuities, such as the so.-called
demographic transition, which were poorly understood in.the past are 	 1
now better understood. On a global basis trends are much more stable
than they are in any single country.
Within the population of a single country there is a fundamental
division in predictability of certain parts of the population. Those
who will be over twenty-five in the year 2000 one can predict.fairly
.. i	 assuredly because they have already been born and age-specific death
rates may not vary much.. On the other hand, those who have not been
born--i.e., those who will be under twenty-five in the year 2000--are
much more subject to decisions whether or not to have children,..which
in turn ' are hearvily influenced by expectations,.food shortages, and
economic growth trends of various kinds.
In any case, we believe that the . .world is now going through an
inflection point. The growth rate of world population seems to be as
high as it ever has been and as high as it ever will be. There should
be a relatively stable trend toward decreasing rates of population
13
growth in the future. This projection results from two phenomena. The
first is the so-called demographic transition: when countries become
relatively more affluent, welfare systems and e ther social mechanisms
tend to replace the traditional functions performed by children, such
as support in old age, support in times of sickness, and so forth. At
the same time, education of children becomes necessary and expensive
and thus becomes a deterrent to having too . -many children. Thus there
is a tendency for relatively affluent populations to decrease their rates
of population growth.	 An opposite trend which has the same influence
over population growth rates is the occurrence of food shortages and
starvation in those countries which have greatly overpopulated them-
selves, particularly the Indian subcontinent and parts of Africa. In
these countries survival has become so difficult, especially for the
very young children, that because of malnutrition disease tends to
increase the death rate to the point where net population growth rates
are much lower than they might . otherwise be. Thus we project a world
population continuing to rise but with a rate of growth decreasing
continuously over a very long period of time.
As shown in Table VII on "Declining Birth Expectations," the expec-
tations of fertile U.S. women regarding the number of children they will
bear have been steadily dropping toward the rate where population growth
will cease. When 1 974 data are available we expect them to show a drop
below the zero population growth level. But this drop does not of .course
mean immediate cessation of population growth; the large bulges in the
age distribution of Americans depicted in Figure 2 on "Distribution of
the Total Population," must first work themselves up through the child-
bearing age brackets, resulting in larger numbers, through smaller rates
of birth. We expect low birth rates to continue because of the changing
role of women-with less emphasis on children and more emphasis on and
opportunity . for work. Moreover, in the short run economic troubles
should cause a further d i.p in tl^e birth  rate.
Table VII
DECLINING BIRTH EXPECTATIONS
CHILDREN.EXPECTED
BY WOMEN AGED BY WOMEN AGED
18-24 25-29
1960
T .
W 1	
3.4
1965 3.1 3.4
1970 2.5 2.8
1971 2.4 2.6
1972 2.3 2.5
1973 2.3 2.4
" VG" LEVEL 2.1 2.1
SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU P- 609254
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i14	 Figure 2
DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY AGE AND SEX:
APRIL I, 1970 AND JULY 1, 197
Age	 _^	 --- -----	 —	 -	 Age
90	 MALE	 FEMALE	 90
1970
80	 CN, 	 1974	 80
7070
60	 60
'r
50	 50
110
	 AO
... i
30 –	 rt	 30
...
2 200 
'r
t..
10	 10
1
Under lUnder 1....	 ........	 ............. r ..,...................... 	 '
2.0	 1.5
	
1.0	 0.5	 . 0	 0.5	 1.0	 1.5	 7.0
Total population in willions
i
	
,.	 FAA
15
As the population "bulge" does work itself up into the older age
brackets, distinct changes in the cultural style of the population will
occur. Not surprisingly, when the bulge representing the post-World War
II baby boom was In its teens, the whole American culture reflected an
emphasis on youth and the teen-age years. As this generation has grown
older (see Table VIII), articles in popular magazines, advertisements
on television, and important economic markets have shifted to reflect,
-First, the style and problems of people in their twenties and now,
increasingly, the tastes and concerns of people in their early thirties.
This bulge in the population distribution thus determines the style of
mass culture.
AGE COHORTS
BORN
	
I N:
AGE	 IN:
1965 1975 1985 1995
BEFORE	 1900 65+ 75+ 85+ 95+
]900-1910 55-65 65+ 75t 85+
1910-1920 45-55 55-65 65+ 75+
1920-1930 35-45 45-55 55-65 65+
1930-1940 25-35 35-45 45-55 55-65
1940-19. 50 15-25 25-35 35-45 45 -55
1950-1960 5-15 15-25 25-35 35-45
1960-1970 0- 5 5-15 15-25 25-35
1970 -1980 --- 0- 5 5-I5 15-25
1980-1990 ---- - -- 0- 5 5.15
A2e Cohorts
An equally important phenomenon tied to age cohorts is the style of
the executives running the country's major organizations. Top executives
tend to be picked from the age cohort that is in its.mid-fifties, and
middle range executives tend to be in their mid-thirties. Since execu-
tives, like other people, tend to carry throughout their life the expec-
tations and perspectives formed in their adolescent and college years,
we can identify the cultural styles of future executives to some extent
by looking at the key experiences which occurred in their late adolescent
years. Table IX, "Changing Executive Generations," illustrates this
phenomenon.
1+RrA
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Table IX
CHANGING EXECUTIVE .GENERATIONS
	
i
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Localism
An important consequence of rising population, spreading population,
environmental concern, rising political organization, and many other
currently important trends, is the accelerating influence of what we
babel "localism." Localism is a defense of narrow local interests at
the expense of the broader needs of the community. Almost everyone
gains by having highways, moderate income housing, factories, airports,
and power plants somewhere in their region. AImost everyone loses by
having these same kinds of infrastructure located in their neighborhood.	 A
Until the last decade this conflict has not been severe. The needed 	 I
MILIEU
RETIRES	 CIRCA 1995
	
CIRCA 2000 	 CIRCA 2105
..	 T
THE "55 YEAR OLD" EXECUTIVE IN-
1965	 1975	 1985
SDRN	 CIRCA 1910	 CIRCA 1920
	 CIRCA 1930
CHILDHOOD
	 WWI	 PROSPEROUS 20s	 DEPRESSION
YOUTH
	 PROSPEROUS 205
	
DEPRESSION
	 WWII
EARLY CORPORATE	 DEPRESSION
	
POST WAR BOOM
	 "ORGANIZATION MAN"
MILIEU
RETIRES	 CIRCA 1975	 CIRCA 1985	 CIRCA 1995
THE "35 YEAR OLD" EXECUTIVE IN:
1965.	 1975	 1.985
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	 CIRCA  1930
	
CIRCA  19 50
	
C I RCA 1950
CHILDHOOD
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regional facilities have almost always found a place. But recently a
series of events and trends have greatly strengthened the hand of local
obstructionists;
1. Disillusionment with progress. "You can't fight progress"
is no longer an unanswerable argument.
2. Environmentalism. Everything pollutes some way.
3. Anti-auto, anti-noise agitation.
4. Community control. This concept did little for the poor,
but middle-class communities can use it . with'a vengeance.
S. Widespread disillusionment with institutions.
b. Flaccid and sometimes stupid leadership. You can beat
city hall.'
7. Discretionary behavior. You can fight city hall and get
away with it.
Thus it becomes more difficult to install and expand the infrastructure
needed for economic development. The problem may be compounded by tax
equalization, revenue sharing, and other legislative or judicial acts
which decouple local revenues from local economic activity, thus reducing
the incentives for local development.
r
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Economic Trends
GNP P ro_iections
Another variable which is relatively pre^:!ictable over long periods
of time is gross national product. Gross national product, however, is
much more sensitive to phenomena such as national power and availability
of inexpensive energy, 'which are relatively hard to predict, than are the
variables we have discussed earlier. The projection of GNP is best done 	 E
not by simple extrapolation but by looking at likely population growth,
labor force participation rates, and rates of productivity increase, and
multiplying these together to obtain projected GNP. Gross national pro-
duct growth is, of course, subject to business cycle fluctuations but is
much more stable over the long-term than these fluctuations would suggest.
The rate of growth of GNP tends to become institutionalized by the social
structure.	 Britain, for instance, because of fundamental characteristics
of its society such as antagonism between businessmen and laboring groups,
has tended to grow fairly stably at two percent per year for at least two
centuries. However it is worth noting that, particularly in modernizing
countries, dramatic changes can sometimes occur in national growth rates.
For instance South Korea after a period of chaos which slowed growth
became in the late 1960s and early 19705 the fastest growing economy in
the world. Thus one must be relatively careful about projecting the
economies of countries which are going through massive socio-political
changes in short periods of time.
It is obviously more difficult to project reliable GNP per capita
than it is to project either population or GNP because the uncertainties
in the estimates of GNP and of population tend to reinforce one another.
Again, obviously, adding more inter-acting variables makes the scenario
i	 more realistic and useful but at the same time more complex and uncertain.
On the following page (Table X) we have projected three alternative
growth rates for the United States, two percent GNP growth per year,
three percent growth and four percent growth. Over a long period of
history U.S. growth rates have fluctuated around three percent in real
terms, and despite some decrease in work-oriented values, despite energy
shortages, and, in the opposite direction, despite the institutionaliza-
tion of better mechanisms for absorption of technological changes, there
is reason to believe that over a long period of time these growth rates
should remain approximately what they have been in the past. At least,
this is the least bad of all alternative assumptions for lone-range
planning purposes.
We have also provided estimates of disposable income over this 1980-
;	 2000 period of time. We believe that if gross national product grows at
a relatively slow rate, for instance at two . percent, then increasing
demands will be put on government for welfare and other measures, and
the, federal budget will grow at relatively high rates.
.1
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'Cable x
ECONOMIC CONTEXTS 1975-20001
(All estimates are in constant 1973 dollars)
1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
U.S.	 GNP 3 1. 1225 1350 1490 1650 2000
II. 1260 1460 1700 1950 2650
III. 1299 1580 1920 2350 3450
U.S. I. 845 930 1030 1150 1375
DISPOSABLE 11. 8,0 1010 1170 1350 1825
INCOME III. 895 1120 1390 1775 2900
u.S. 2 1. 305 370 410 450 550
BUDGET 11. 315 365 420 500 650
III. 325 355 430 525 800
_ 1
] Case I. assumes GNP average growth of 2 percent/year
Case 11. assumes GNP average growth of 3 percent/year
Case Ili. assumes GNP average growth of 4 percent/year
2 Case 1.	 assumes Budget = 27.5 percent GNP
Case 11. assumes Budget = 25 percent GNP
Case III. assumed Budget = 22.5 percent GNP
(in 1975 all are taken as 25 percent of GNP)
3 'Disposable income is assumed to remain at 69 percent of GNP. There
are, of course, complex transfer payments between federal,state,-and --
local governments (e.g. revenue-sharing) .
 and from the federal budget
to personal disposable personal income (e.g. social security). These
can be expected to increase, and the total will increasingly be
greater than GNP.
Inflation
The difficulty of making long-term forecasts in a rapidly changing
environment has increased recently. during the 1960s, rising awareness
of the need to protect the natural environment led to private and public
decisions which threw monkey-wrenches into many long-term projections.
The 1974-75 inflationary recession has made economic forecasting doubly
dismal: now econometric modelers must attempt to forecast economic vari-
ables in a period of extreme uncertainty and anamolous expectations.
Until the late 1960s, post-war American economic history has con-
sisted of reasonably stable growth, relatively full employment, and
slowly creeping price inflation; macroeconomic policy, both fiscal and
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monetary, had successfully moderated the business cycle to insure against
repetition of the 1930s. Until Great Society programs and the Vietnam
war accelerated price and wage inflation, the thought of price--wage con-
trols in peacetime was inconceivable. By 1969, however, the annual rate
of inflation passed 5 percent and monetary restraint was applied to bring
inflation back down to previous levels. While unemployment increased to
over 6 percent in early 1971, inflation did not subside; in August 1971,.
President Nixon announced his "New Economic Policy" which included price-
wage controls (see Figure 3, "U.S. Inflation and Unemployment, 1963-197411).
In January 1973, Phase 111 of the price-wage controls was implemented.,
permitting food and commodity prices to explode. With the.quadrupling of
oil prices in late 1973, the stage was set for evolution of the American
economy to its present worsening situation of high inflation, high and
rising unemployment, and sharply dropping GNP. Several alternative
scenarios suggest the possibilities open to the American aconomy during
the next few years (see Figure 4, "A Reflationary Scenario"). Judicious
macroeconomic policy might accomplish a soft landing after inflation
decreases and unemployment drops slowly, following the onset of recovery,.
projected by the Ford Administration. On the other 	 hand, recovery might
be too sharp, leading to an investment boom which refiates both GNP:and
prices too quickly, at which point inflationary expectations and corpor-
ate illiquidity might combine to force output sharply down. Finally,
recovery might not quite set in at all, leading to persistent high
unemployment and probably price deflation (a mini-depression). Figure`
5 illustrates the two scenarios in terms of macroeconomic parameters.
Obviously, the American economy has entered . a new period in which
the primacy of economic anomolies has rendered conventional econometric
models less than meaningful for the purpose of forecasting. The hazards
of making business-es-usual long-term forecasts based on traditional
economic (and other).trends need not be elaborated, since they ought to
be clear at this point in time. Future behavior of the .economy will
depend on private spending, saving and investment decisions, as well as
on public fiscal and monetary policies. Due to the current high level
of confusion in energy and economic affairs, it is probably safe to
assume that there is no single set of policies which is both optimal
and politically practical. The next few years will see much experimen-
tation as economic and energy policymakers attempt to sort out the com-
plex new interactions and to formulate policies and programs that mini-
mize collateral damage in other areas:
21
Figure 3
U.S. INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1963--1974
AND AN OFFICIAL OMB FORECAST, 1975-19 BO
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22	 Fi(pire 4
A "WORST PLAUSIBLE CASE" FOR CORPORATE PLANNING:
THE REFLATION CYCLE SCENARIO
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Figure 5
TEMPORAL EVOLUTION OF PRIMARY MACROECONOMIC PARAMETERS
IN THE TWO SCENARIOS
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j	 The solid lines show OMB projections (1975-80) and the dotted lines show
the reflationary scenario. Precise timing and rates of chan.ge .could
vary considerably, of course. Rise in the rate of change of real output
is generally preceded or accompanied by a drop in the rate of change of
prices. The lagged .change in the unemployment. rate in any year is
approximately given by one-third of the difference between the rate of
change of real GNP and 4 percent (the productivity.trend), according to
Arthur Okun's well-known rule of thumb.
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International Trade
Pacific Basin
One of the largest-scale long -term phenomena that Hudson Institute
has identified has been the acceleration of economic growth in the
Pacific Basin. Because of the influence of rapid Japanese growth,
rising availability of capital in the region (from both American and
Japanese sources) improved transportation, and the peculiarly_ adaptable
traits of Chinese culture for industrial development, the Pacific Basin
region has begun to .grow very rapidly and is likely to continue to grow
very rapidly in the future. This means that commercial transport needs
will rise dramatically in the next generation. It also means that
tourism is likely to experience an extraordinary development. We have
already seen the initial phases of this dramatic increase in.commerce
and tourism. It is possible that straightforward projection of these
increases would greatly underestimate the eventual strength of the trend.
We include a chartshowing one scenario for Japanese tourism which could
apply to Korea but possible even more likely to Taiwan. As can be seen
the effects of vast numbers of Japanese tourism would have a remarkable
influence over Korean and Taiwanese development and over the development
of transportation networks in North East Asia. (Cf. Figures 6 and 7
which show several examples of the rapid growth of tourism.) Detailed
economic projections for the Pacific Basin and selected other regions
are shown in Appendix III. The.Pacific Basin phenomenon could be dis-
continued by prolonged, severe depression, by major war, or by a major
confrontation between Japan and Southeast Asia (e.g., over use of the
Malacca Straits), but should continue otherwise.
Multinational Corporations
Great multinational corporations, which originated in the United
States, Japan, and Western Europe, will likely continue to expand their
role as the leading edge of technological progress; the major determi-
nants of the structures of national economies and the world economy;
and the principal instruments of economic development in the non-commu-
nist world. The multinationals possess extraordinary comparat i ve advan-
tages in raising and investing capital; in creating and managi.g organi-
zations; in obtaining information and using it for corporate planning
.purposes; and in innovating and transferring technology. They have
superior facilities for distributing, maintaining, marketing, and
financing their products. They Furnish local elites with extraordinary
career opportunities and therefore attract the finest talent available
in much of the world.. They .have creat.ed.successful and .sophisticated
systems for educating and upgrading blue-collar; white-collar, and
management talent. Increasingly they provide governments with major
inputs of savings and taxes.
The rise of the multinational corporations is favored by continued
world peace, by political stability in most countries, and by a prosper-
ous world economy. They obtain advantages from those new technologies
25
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which require Iarge amounts of capital and advanced technological skills,
and from those which provide great economies of scale. They are favored
by relative decreases in transportation and communication costs and by
dispersion of resources and markets throughout the world. They are also
favored by increasing standardization of markets for many kinds of pro-
ducts throughout the world, as well as--somewhat paradoxicalIy---by their
exceptional ability to adapt to changes in those markets. Hitherto the .
multinationals have benefited from the lack of pervasive or effective
interference from political authorities, but one of the great imponder-
ables in their future is the extent to which political authorities will
act to ltm. i .t the growth and capacities of the multinationals. The home.
countries of the multinationals; principally the U.S., Japan, and Western
Europe, have increasingly become sensitive to the alleged avoidance of
taxes and export of jobs to other countries 	 The host countries . in both
the developed and developing world have become sensitive to what some...
perceive as the exploitation and dependence that result from.the activi-
ties.of multinational corporations whose gross sales are frequently
larger than the gross national products of the host countries.' The
degree to which these political sensitivities will inhibit the growth
of the multinationals is difficult to project, but even if the effect
is fairly strong the multinationals are likely to continue growing at
a relatively rapid rate.
i
S
Such statistics, which show General Motors as "larger" than
Switzerland, have often been invoked to suggest that G.M. is somehow
more powerful than Switzerland. This is obvious political nonsense, .
at least within the.territary.over which the Swiss government exercises .
sovereignty and the unchallengeab] power to exclude, regulate, tax, or
even expropriate G.M. Moreover, tFe relevant economic comparison to
GNP is not gross sales, but valuezidded, which requires subtracting..
the company's purchases ("imports"). from sales:
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Defense Trends
Defense problems are among the least predictable, but unfortunately
most important, areas of projection. Our surprise-free projections
excluded both major war and.major peace. We exclude major wars because
nuclear weapons are so devastating that major powers are deterred from
involvement in confrontations which might ^.scalate uncontrollably; of
course, this does not mean we can rest free from fcar in this regard.
When we exclude major peace we mean that small wars continue to be likely,
and that major power tensions are very unlikely ti disappear or to become
ameliorated far beyond the present situation. 	 7his implies that there
will continue to be large markets for military aircraft. Here it is
worth noting that the recent NATO jet fighter decision has implications
for the U.S. or the T=rench aviation industry that could have a ten-to-
twenty year impact.
The international situations which would most likely disprove our
projection of "no major war" would likely occur because of Middle East
confrontation, a change in the international posture of Japan, the dis-
integration of India as a nation-state, or the disintegration of NATO's
southern flank and one or more communist takeovers in Italy, Spain or
Portugal.
It is also possible to imagine relatively large military campaigns,
such as extended anti-submarine warfare operations, which would consume
military material like wars but which would be unlike big wars in their
effects on trade and on civilians. Similarly a major rise in tension,
for instance, in Central Europe, might have war-like consequences for
the defense industry, including massive increases in military spending.
Nuclear Proliferation Potential
Perhaps the international situation with the most complex conse-
quences for the aviation and space industries will be nuclear prolifera-
tion. Before the end of the century, countries like Taiwan, Argentina,
Brazil, South Africa, Israel, 'Egypt, India, Pakistan and Iran are likely
to possess at least primitive fission weapons. Terrorist groups may
well possess, or attempt to capture, nuclear weapons also. The net
effect of such proliferation will be to make the U.S. and other countries
terribly vulnerable and. to place an enormous premium on systems for'
detection of attempts to convey nuclear weapons into the country. When.
one reflects on the enormous expenditures and organizational effort pre-
cipitated by a few aircraft hijackings, the potential response to a
nuclear.threat or to a single clandestine nuclear attack strikes home.
Truly vast expenditures for high technology monitoring equipment and
low technology interception equipment could result.
Defense Budget--Support for Aeronautical R&D
The U.S. defense budget depends upon the international environment,
which we have acknowledged as unpredictable, and upon domestic political
events, which are if anything less predictable. Nevertheless, defense
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budgets have typically fluctuated between five and ten percent of GNP.
The current defense budget runs about 5.6 percent of GNP and is very
unlikely to go much lower. We would expect a gradual rise over the
next few years, with dramatic increases in the event of any important
crisis that is resolved adversely. (See projections in Tables Xi and
XI I.)
Historically a very large part of the income of the U.S. aerospace
industry has been from defense products. This situation will probably
continue, if indeed the balance does not tip further towards defense.
Therefore, it is likely that the great bulk of useful aerospace R&D will
be defense-oriented, and indeed that companies and the Congress will find
it easiest to fund new technology for defense first; commercial applica-
tions will be largely by spin-off. Let us consider some possibilities.
Important questions for the health of the aerospace industry itself
include the probability of long production runs of individual aircraft or
missiles and the avoidance of a boom-bust economic pattern. It would
seem, then, that the aerospace industry may have a strong interest in
driving down individual airframe costs. At present a major part of air-
frame cost is avionics cost; and a md'j3t' reason for short production runs
its the need to make major airframe or engine changes to accommodate new
avionics. A useful way out would be accelerated development of the new
miniaturized integrated electronics. It is in the direct interest of the
aerospace industry to concentrate on driving down the unit cost and size
of electronic components. Such advances will very possibly do more good .
for the industry than will any other technical achievements.
The next best prospect is for multi-purpose and modular .engines, as
engine standardization can drive up engine production runs and hence
further cut unit costs.
Any reduction in the unit cost of U.S. military aircraft helps us
compete in the foreign market. We estimate that there is a°good chance
for U.S. dominance of this market. At present military sales are a.
primary factor in the recycling of Arab oil money, hence in the stability
of U.S. foreign exchange. In general high technology, including high
aerospace technology, has been and probably will continue to be the
greatest source of U.S. trade abroad. In this judgment we include the
agricultural plenty produced by an advances! technology.
We can expect a fairly consistent development from currently fielded
military systems. This judgment is a . consequence of the long lead times
and high unit cost of military hardware. No radical changes are very
likely unless there is a war demonstrating the bankruptcy of current
concepts.
Potential Weapon System Developments
Current lines of development include . greater accuracy in all types of
missiles and the proliferation of powerful surface-to-surface and air-to-
surface weapons placing small demands upon their launch platforms. Such
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Table X1
NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET
ACTUAL . l ^`?9--1975; PROJECTED 1975-2000
Gross National National 13
Year Product (A) Defense Budget {B) A (%)
1539 90.5 1.2 1.3
1940 99.7 2.2 2.2
1941 124.5 13.8 11.1
1942 157.9 49.4 31.3
1943 191.6 79.7 41.6
1944 210.1 8';.4 41.6
1945 21119 73.5 34.7
1946 208.5 14.7 7.1
1947 231.3 9.1 3.9
1948 257.6 10.7 4.2
1949 256.5 13.3 5.2
1950 284.8 14.1 5.0
1951 328.4 33.6 10.2
1952 345.5 45.9 13.3
1953 364 .6 48.7 13.4
1954 364.8 41.2 11.3
1955 398.0 38.6 9.7
1956 419.2 4o.3 9.6
1957 441.1 44.2 1 0.0
1958 447.3 45.9 10.3
1959 483.7 46.0 9.5
1960 503.7 44.9 8.9
1961 520.1 47.8 9.2
1962 560.3 51.6 9.2
1963 590.5 50.8 8.6
1964 632.4 50.0 7.9
1965 684.9 50.1 7.3
1966 749.9 6o.7 8.1
I	 1967 793.9 72.4 9.1
{	 1968 864.2 78.3 9 .1
1969 93x .3 78.4 8.4
1970 977.1 74.0 7.6
i	 1971 1,055.5 71.6 6.8
1972 1,155.2 74 .4 6.4
1973 1,288.2 .74.2 5.8
1974 1;348.7 78.6 5.8
1975	 (est.) 1,43I.1 85.3 6,0
1939-1974 National defense budget figures are net of government
sales.
Source: Economic Report of the President,
	
February 1974.
Current U.S.	 Dollars	 (Billions)
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Table X11
PROJECTED NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET
1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
Case	 I	 a 61 68 75 83 100
It	 a 63 73 85 98 133
III	 a 65 79 96 118 173
Case	 I	 b 92 101 112 124 150
11	 b 95 110 128 146 200
III
	 b 97 119 144 176 260
Case	 I c 123 135 149 165 200
11	 c 126 146 170 195 265
H] c 130 158 192 235 345
Case I assumes GNP average growth of 2 percent/year
Case 2	 tt	 tt	 It
	
It	 11 3
	
It	 11
Case 3
	
it	 It	 it	 It	 11 4
	
It	 It
a = National Defense Budget assumed to equal 5.0% of GNP
b =	 I1	 tl
	
It
	 11	 It	 It	 7.5%	 11	 11
C =	 I1	 II	 tl	 11	 11	 11	 10.70%0 	 It	 it
Estimates in constant 1973 dollars - Billions
weapons promise great if transient military power to small nations at a
low initial cost. To counter them we are likely to invest heavily in
tactical air defense systems, which will possibly include destructive
lasers. The most radical technical innovations.will probably be made in
tactical air defense.
The growing accuracy of strategic missiles may encourage a change in
our current deployment of strategic missiles. Probably there w 0 l be a
new generation of mobile ICBM's; there may also be a resurgence of interest
in a combination bomber/missile launcher. That in turn means more money
spent on precise air navigation devices.
The proliferation of command-guided air launched missiles will prob-
ably mean that even m,re money will be spent on various forms of ECM.
Once more this means that avionics is more significant in some ways than
is aerodynamics. Interesting ECM ideas might include attempts to jam air
borne or ground computers. Great advances along these lines might
jeopardize military fly-by-wire.
i,
3
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At present there seems to be some hope in the aerospace industry for
a revival of very long production runs trough the adoption of cheap RPV's.
We would suspect that ECM will largely negate tE,e promise of the RPV. But
it will render absolutely vital the discrimination of the pilot on the
spot.
Another development of interest is the use of fields of sensors in
land combat and anti-submarine warfare. The sensors are typically air-
delivered and are often monitored by airborne vehicles. They offer large
opportunities both for automating warfare and for achieving decisive
results via electronic countermeasures. and deception. At the least they 	 r
will probably mean a shift to more elaborate and expensive ;and aerospace-
oriented) systems in ground combat. (here may be some large production
runs of a multiservice data processor as well.
One interesting airframe consequenf:e of growing attack missile
accuracy may be more popularity for VTOL/STOL aircraft, on the theory that
large air bases make inviting targets, in naval warfare, VTOL makes pos-
sible the projection of naval air power without the expense of big
carriers. But the reader is cautioned that those sentiments have been
widely expressed for quite some time, without any V/STOL boom. An important
factor in the future of military V/STOL is payload capacity. If new
developments such as the Rockwell FV12 demonstrate that the load and speed
drawbacks of previous VTOL's have been overcome, then probably these air-
craft will come to dominate the tactical aircraft market.
In that case there will be a demand for the re-equipment of most
tactical air fleets, i.e., a great surge in the international aircraft
!	 market.
Foreign Military Needs
These general technical conclusions must be tempered by a projection
of U.S. and foreign military needs in the rest of the century. We would
expect few radical political changes, except for a gradual enrichment of
the "Third World" (not the "Fourth World" of resource -poor LDC's) via
increased sales of raw materials. Such an enrichment will quite probably
be channeled into arms procurement, probably including nuclear arms in
many cases. The existence of a high level of armaments in any one
country of the "THird World".
 will almost certainly encourage arms procure-
ment in its neighbors; and most of these arms are likely to come from the
U.S, and Soviet aerospace industries. Probably the rate of war in the
"Third World" will increase, and that increase will accelerate various
arms trends already in evidence,
We project large U.S, arms sales abroad, not because this country has
some desire to enrich itself at the expense of others, but because
increasingly the refusal of arms sales will be seen as a distinctly hostile
act by suppliers of vital materials. Moreover, the performance of U.S. or
Soviet weaponE in these small wars (e.g., the Middle East War of October
1973) is the only way in which the quality of our weapons and hence the
effectiveness of our own prices can be proves[ to the other side.
Ultimately it is that quality which guarantees much of the stability of
A- 1
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such vital fronts as that in Central Europe. dempon quality is of
singular consequence to a power which relies, as we do--and the Soviets
do not--on technology in place of manpower.
Outside Europe we can expect more and more concern for the safety of
our seaborne commerce, as we grow more dependent upon foreign suppliers.
This in turn means a larger fleet; but warships are so expensive that no
large naval expansion is feasible unless a far cheaper approach is tried.
That returns us to the absolute need for lower unit costs via compact
electronics, and, quite probably, small aircraft carriers with VTOL's.
..	 ..	
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Resource Trends
Food Supplies
When the world faces severe food shortages or famine, the attention
of the public, of politically active elites, and of decision-makers quite
naturally becomes . focused on that problem, which ca p have enormous influ-
ence over the budgets of apparently expendable programs. If the crisis
is short run the public will probably prove slow to perceive that many
of the difficulties are actually distribution problems rather than supply
problems. But a persistent crisis, one which lasts for many years, is
likely to produce intense awareness of distribution problems and lead to
creation of new programs to distribute grain and other foods quickly to
crisis areas. More generally, the recurrence of any kind of resource
shortage due in substantial part to a distribution problem is likely to
produce a demand for redundancy of distribution systems. Thus areas
threatened by starvation because roads are subject to washout may demand
emergency airlift capabilities. Periodic shortages of various kinds of
materials, including food, petroleum and other resources, are likely to
lead to li..^.reasing demands for all kinds of stockpiles. There may be
special kinds of distribution issues raised by the necessity for main-
taining such stockpiles and for insuring that they are useable in a
crisis.
Although many people currently believe that rising population and
rising shift in newly affluent countries from cereals to meat imply
permanent food shortages for much of the world, Hudson's studies indi-
cate that food problems are probably temporary and that such shortages
as do occur in coming years will likely result more from the failure
of distribution systems than from any worldwide scarcity of food. Food
shortages in Africa have.proved to result almost exclusively from dis-
tribution system failures. The food shortage of 1974 resulted in sub-
stantial part from an unlikely combination of unwise cultivation patterns
in certain parts of Africa; bad weather in China, the Soviet Union, and
other places; American production policies; windfall purchasing by the
Soviet Union; and overfishing off Latin America. Much of the 1974 aura
of doom has already been dispelled by rising production in the United
States, by the cancellation of Soviet and Chinese gt:iin orders, and by
falling agricultural prices in much of the world. {nonetheless food 	 3'
shortages will recur perhaps for over a period as long as 15 years,
especially in countries such as India and certain African countries	 F
whose distribution systems are incompetent. high petroleum prices will,
if they persist, continue to slow down the rate of agriculturat.moderni- 	 E
zation in developing nations by raising the price of fertilizer. Popula-
tion growth and shifts from grain to meat will continue to press demands
on world agriculture upward. Nonetheless a gradual evolution of fertilizer
technologies should greatly improve the availability of fertilizer over
a period of 15 years. Officials of the International Rice Research Insti-
tute in the Philippines believe that new strains of rice, which are areat
improvements over what was so recently called "miracle rice," provide the
gEPRODUCIBU	 05 '^ ^
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technical possibility of multiplying world rice output by a factor of 4
over a period of a decade; such production would of course so far out-
strip world demand for food that an increase of this magnitude would
never occur. Systematic management of ocean products should greatly
enhance the contribution aquaculture makes to world food production as
indicated.in
 Appendix 11 of this report on aquaculture. Overall, then,
we project recurrent food crises in some parts of the world for a period
of up to 15 years, but believe that food production is likely to vastly
outstrip population growth and to rise to meet increased demands from
r
increasingly affluent populations.
Petroleum Energy Supply
All of these pro.! ¢;,ctlons depend, of course, on the availability of
adequate energy and other materials to feed growth at the rates indicated.
The view that adequate resources will not be available has become wide-
spread, based on two distinct arguments. The First argument is that the
world is expending resources as such a rapid and accelerating rate that
by the end of this century resources of many kinds will be exhausted.
The second argument is political, holding that other cartels will follow
the lead of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
create cartels which limit the availability of materials, or raise their
prices so high that growth is slowed.
Our judgment of the first argument is that it is based upon basic
analytic errors. Most fundamentally, it is based upon an assumption of
"resources" as fixed quantitites not subject to technological multiplica-
tion and on "pollution" as a fixed product of economic growth not subject
to technological diminution. Using the logic of the most forceful presen-
tation of this first argument, in The Limits to Growth, which projected
130 years ahead and found sudden economic collapse, a Shell team went
back 134 years and found that the methods predicted exhaustion of resources
long before the present. (thew Scientist, 27 July 1972.) Likewise, for
pollution, Norman MacRae has pointed out that an extrapolation of the
trends of the 1880s would show today's cities buried In horse manure;
in this perspective the automobile is a highly successful pollution
control device.
We have illustrated in Figure 8, "Selected Fossil Fuel Resources,"
three conservative estimates of world and U.S. fossil fuel resources,
under alternative assumptions of zero growth, 2.5 percent growth, or 5.
percent growth in world energy demand. World petroleum at a growth rate
of 2.5 percent or 5 percent can run short early in the next century, but
It seems clear that the supplies of coal for the world and the U.S., and
the U.S. oil shale supply, will last far into the period in which they
are expected to be displaced by newer sources of energy.
A second error of those who believe we are running out of resources
has been misunderstanding of the concept of "proved reserves." The .
amount of known energy resources at any time is not a fixed quantity;
it involves the concept of reserves, which is an economic concept similar
36
Figure 8
SELECTED FOSSIL FUEL RESOURCES
10001	 Estimated Conservatively
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to that of a business inventory. In fact, a number of different ideas
are involved in the concept of reserves. The American Petroleum Insti-
tute distinguishes these as follows:
"Oil in place is the amount of oil present in known reservoirs.
Proved reserves are the estimated quantities of crude oil which
geological and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable
certainty to be recoverable from known reservoirs under exist-
ing economic and operating conditions."
Proved reserves are bound to increas- according to the economic and
operating conditions of the time. They will be closely related to energy
prices and technology:
"Proved reserves at any time are quite distinct from forecasts
of what will be made into reserves later. Recent discoveries
in Northern Alaska were originally said . to 'contain' from 5
to 10 billion barrels. This was the amount expected to be
developed in the course of years. Eight months lamer there
was an implicit reserve forecast, when it was announced that
a pipeline built from the area would have a capacity of 2
million barrels daily (MBD), which indicates about 15 billion
barrels forthcoming in 20 years. It would be a mistake to com-
pare either forecast with proved reserves or with oil-in-place.""
Reserves of any useful resource will be somewhat larger than the
minimum needed for economic planning. In the U.S., the reserves of oil
have historically 	 about 12 times annual production; when they have-
fallen below this amount, it has been a sign of incipient shortage and
a future price increase. When the ratio of reserves to production is
much larger (e.g., in the Middle East, it is now about 70 years' reserves);,
it indicates that resources will not be devoted to finding new sources
for the immediate future, since the reserves are adequate and a shortage
will not appear for a long time, This means that it has not been possible
so far to project when oil reserves or other resources might be exhausted.
New resources and new reserves are discovered as further investments are
made in exploration.
In sum, known energy resources seem to be adequate for the reasonably
foreseeable future, as we have listed in the foregoing Figure 8.
,petroleum Energy Cost
Figure 9, "Future Petroleum Prices," indicates a variety of possible
oil price scenarios. Although there is a great deal of variation inthe
prices in the 1975-1985 period depending on the scenario, one notices
that the prices tend to cluster at the $3/barrel (in 1950 dollars) level
M.A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real!" f=oreign Policy, 10, 1973.
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as one approaches 2000. The exception is the OPEC business-as-usual
scenario which hypothesizes lack of production coordination among the
OPEC countries leading to a glut of world oil supply, rapid conservation
and substitution, and thus a precipitous decline in world oil prices.
Notice, however, that if the OPEC nations learn their lesson from this
experience and are able to militarily dominate the Persian Gulf, the
rapid decline in prices in the late 1970s could serve as a surrogate 	 j
for the first step inian anti-Project Independence strategy. This
would enable those who control Persian Gulf supply to once again control 	 r
world price at high levels, with variations of price to keep competition
off balance and/or to meet temporary internal needs.
"Petroleum Supply," Figure 9, indicates the supply side of the above
four scenarios. These indica-e that without OPEC production control,
petroleum supply should be adequate to meet future world needs. The
OPEC control scenarios indicate that world supply would be either very
unstable in the 1975-1990 period or very low throughout. In either case
it would be desirable for the U.S. to have a fall-back position for meet-
ing its fuel needs.
Nuclear Energy
Turning from petroleum to nuclear energy, Figure 10, "Selected
Nuclear Energy Resources," demonstrates that adequate nuclear fuel exists
for many years of continued growth. The problem with nuclear energy has
not been lack of fuel, but rather difficult engineering and safety prob-
lems. An initial phase of very optimistic projections of U.S, nuclear 	 ^'!
power generation has passed, as shown by Figure 11, graphing changes in
official estimates of U.S. nuclear power capacity in 1980. However, it
is not impossible that a few technological breakthroughs, together with
the price incentives provided by OPEC, wilt change the longer .run out 	 j
look for nuclear power. In the meantime, the U.S. has enormous reserves
of coal which can carry it well into, and perhaps through, the next
century.	 a
Resource Cartels
The success of the OPEC cartel and the rising demand for other
resources have raised in many minds the question whether other resources
are not also subject to carteiization. Will we indeed have one, two
many OPECs? Our conclusion is that petroleum is rather unique in this
regard, that most other.. resources will not be subject to easy carteli-
zation any thar there is. not likely to be any persistent or widespread
shortage of raw materials in the world during the last quarter of the
20th century. This does not mean that there will not be temporary bottle-
necks which could prove very disruptive in the short run. Because of the
possibility of such bottlenecks it is possible that stockpiling of various
key materials may once again be a wise policy and a policy increasingly
I	 adopted by the U.S. government and by governments throughout the world.
f	 We are aware that th-e present trend in the United. States is to.diminish
I	 stockpiles of many ki nds of materials because they are believed not to
be necessary for defense, but we also believe that an economic rationale
k	 is substituting for the old military rationale and that eventually some
E	 of these stockpiles--especially of food--will be restored. d
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Data for 1962-1975 is derived from va-ious issues of The Nuclear Industry, an annual
publication by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, with the exception of the data
point for early 1974. That point was provided by J. Conner, Director of the USAEC
Office of Planning and Analysis, in a talk prepared for the Atomic Industrial Forum's
International Conference on Uranium Enrichment, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1974.
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In fable X11i we provide for comparison a list of the metals most
subject to cartelization, and a list of the metals most critical to aero-
nautics. Chromium, mercury, nickel, titanium and tungsten appear on
both lists. Stockpiling and also research on substitutes for vulnerable
metals should perhaps be a high priority task. Appendix III provides a
more detailed look at the prospects for raw materials.
Table XII1	 r
THE ELEVEN MINERALS MOST VULNERABLE
TO CARTELIZATION OR EMBARGO
VULNERABILITY
MATERIAL	 INDEX	 PRINCIPAL OR MAJOR EXPORTERS
CHROMIUM	 31,	 USSR, R. OF S AFRICA
PLATINUM GROUP	 32	 USSR, CANADA, R. OF S. AFRICA
TUNGSTEN
	 27	 CANADA, PERU
MANGANESE	 23	 BRAZIL, GABON
ALUMINUM	 22	 JAMAICA, CANADA
TITANIUM
	
2O	 AUSTRALIA CANADA
COBALT	 20	 CANADA, ZAIRE
TANTALUM	 16	 CANADA, BRAZIL, ZAIRE
NICKEL	 14	 CANADA, NORWAY
MERCURY	 11	 CANADA, MEXICO, SPAIN
TIN	 6	 MALAYSIA, THAILAND
SOURCE: ALWYN H. KING AND JOHN R. CAMERON, "MATERIALS AND THE
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT," NEW DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY
(NEW YORK.: CROWELL, 1975) p. 95•
Y
MINERALS IDENTIFIED AS PROBABLY CRITICAL TO
AERONAUTICS, 1980-2000
ALUMINUM
	
COAL	 MERCURY
ANTIMONY	 COPPER	 MICA
*ARSENIC	 *GALLIUM	 MOLYBDENUM
ASBESTOS	 *GERMON I UM	 NICKEL
BERYLLIUM	 *INDIUM	 TITANIUM
BORON	 IRON	 TUNGSTEN
CADIUM	 LEAD	 VANADIUM
CHROMIUM	 MAGNESIUM	 ZINC	
I
ZURCONIUM
AVIONICS AND RELATED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
s
^	
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Effect of Climate
A very predictable trend is the trend of long-term climatic change.
Scientists tend to agree that no major ice age is likely to be forth-
coming for a period on the order of three to thirty thousand years, but
many believe that there is a shorter-term current trend toward gradual
cooling and drought. if this trend continues, then Food shortages will
become more probable in bad harvest years in this century; this will
require more effort from policymakers, and will exert increasing N MI-
ence over public attitudes. Food shortages have a particularly powerful
effect can public opinion even in countries which are not particularly
affected by those shortages. In particular it seems true that when
food shortages exist people's sense of priorities tends to lean rather
heavily toward supply of these basic needs at the cost of what many see
as less immediately needed projects.
Prior to the year 2000 there may be significant changes in weather
and in man's control over weather. Here it is useful to distinguish
climate change (natural or unintended modification of weather patterns),
climate control (deliberate alteration of major climatic patterns),. and
weather modification (deliberate alteration of short-term weather).
Various scientists have asserted that some climate change is occurring,
and in particular have warned that the climate may become gradually
colder; such possibilities are still too unproven to constitute a basis
for serious planning, but they must be monitored because of the extra- s
ordinary implications of even small climate changes for food production."
Similarly, assertions that man-made increases in atmospheric dust and
carbon dioxide could cause serious cooling or warming of the earth,
respectively, need monitoring but cannot be substantiated as a basis
for planning decisions at this time. Likewise, the long-term weather
effects of the warming of rivers by power plants and the 5 to 10 degree
warming of the atmosphere around major cities may be of great but cur-
rently unknowable significance. When the causes of weather patterns,
and the effects of human technology upon those weather patterns are
better understood, the prospects for deliberate climate modification
may loom larger than they do today.
- 4
"Cf. Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., "Climate Changes Called Ominous,"
The New York rimes, January 19, 1975,.
	 P. 8.
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Transportation Trends
The standard approach to forecasting future transportation needs is
to estimate future requirements for various kinds of services in terms
of what people will produce, distribute and consume and where they will
do so. This requires a systematic analysis of the present and potential
economic base of the area of interest, the spatial distribution of popu-
lation, patterns of land use, and for freight, a "base survey" which
would normally include an appraisal of natural resources, population and
labor force, and the existing and potential industrial infrastructure.
From this, estimates of future transportation requirements are generated.
Available transport systems are then evaluated against existing and
anticipated future requirements for the area in question and major
technological improvements in different forms of transportation are
analyzed to select the best mix of existing and potential future trans-
por^ation modes. This approach is illustrated in Figure 12, a typical
demand forecasting model.
In selection of the modal structure, other considerations also come
into play. Ecological considerations are of increasing importance, as
are energy requirements. These tend to dictate the directions which
transportation evolution may advance. Table XIV lists some of these
directions and the anticipated time period for their development.
Availability of discretionary income will have a pronounced effect on
the futures of the air transport industry. This aspect is examined in
Appendix IV.
In the United States, the principal urban transportation mode is
the private automobile. In modified form, to cope with environmental
and energy factors, it is expected to remain dominant, with at least
75% of the total urban transit burden by 1990." Thus no more than 25%
of urban area trips are anticipated to be handled by mass transit in
that time frame. That this will impose a tremendous load on the urban
and suburban highway systems of the nation goes without saying, and
measures have been tried in many areas for many years to divert travel-
lers from private tc public mass transportation. Moves in that direc-
tion often take the form of new high speed rapid transit systems such
as San Francisco B.A.R.T. and Washington, D. C.'s new subway system.
High Density Intercity Transportation
In developing magalopolises such as the U.S. northeast corridor
and California's San Diego to San Francisco strip, inter-city travel
is on the upswing and systems are developed to cope with the situation.
In these instances, air and high speed ground transportation often
compete. Thus the Metroliner connecting Boston, New York and Washing-
ton, D. C. with a New York to Washington trip time of 31 hours, as
*
The Effects of Varying Policies and Assumption on National Highway
Requirements, by D.S. Gendeil et. al., U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration. p resented at Highway Research Board
Conference, Washington, D. C. January, 1973.
._ .... t
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DEMAND FORECASTING MODEL
PASSENGER
	
FREIGHT
PATTERNS OF LAND USE	 FUTURE SPATIAL PATTERN
AND	 OF
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION	 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
TRIP OR TRAFFIC
GENERATION
a
ZONAL INTERCHANGE
OR
DISTRIBUTION
t
I	 SERVICE COST
MODAL CHOICE
	
AND
PRICE CHARACTERISTICS
i
ROUTE ASSIGNMENT
BY MODE.
ii
SOURCE: THE FUTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FO.R REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION
PLANNING, JOHN R. MEYER, IN PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AND PLANNING: THE RAND CORPORATION,
JANUARY 25-27, 1971
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Table XIV
DIRECTIONS IN TRANSPORTATION EVOLUTION
TIME FRAME
° GASOUS FUELS IN URBAN FLEET SYSTEMS CONTINUING
° GROWTH OF URBAN MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS CONTINUING
° ELECTRIFICATION OF CORRIDOR RAIL SYSTEMS CONTINUING
° GAS TURBINES IN INTERCITY TRUCKS AND BUSES MID-70'S
° SMALLER, LESS POWERFUL AUTOS 	 (NO SPEED SACRIFICE) LATE-701S
° ELECTRIFIED MASS TRANSIT; ELECTRIC AUTOS	 IN URBAN EARLY BO'S
RENTAL FLEETS
° IMPROVED HIGH SPEED GROUND SYSTEMS IN CORRIDORS EARLY BO'S
° REPLACEMENT OF MODIFIED S.I,	 ENGINE WITH	 INHERENTLY MID-BO'S
LOW EMISSION ENGINE	 (GAS TURBINE OR STIRLING)
° SIGNIFICANT USE OF SYNTHETIC PETROLEUM 1990
.f,
° POSSIBLE USE OF NON-PETROLEUM FUELS IN FLEET SYSTEMS 1990
° H n FUEL CELLS FOR INTERCITY/RURAL AUTO 2000
REFERENCE:	 "'J.S. TRANSPORTATION--SOME ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
COIISIDERATIONS" BY W.E.	 FRAIZE, THE MITRE CORPORATION,
SEPTEMBER 1971,
	
M72-164.
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compared with an Eastern Airlines shuttle flight with an air block time
of 35 to 50 minutes, depending on equipment used. Total travel time from
city center to city center may not be too far apart, however, when ru,
hour traffic departure and en route flight delays are considered. Thus
a traveller leaving New York on a Metroliner at 9:00 a.m. would arrive
in downtown Washington at 12:30 p.m., while the same traveller opting
for the shuttle might miss the 10:00 a.m. shuttle due to surface traffic
between Manhattan and La Guardia airport and arrive in Washington no
sooner. Even if he makes the 10 o'clock shuttle, departure delays might
see him airborne at 10:30 and in the Washington area by 11:15, but
arrival delays could further slow him so as to bring him into Washington
at the same time as the Metroliner, but considerably more frustrated.
This situation may become more favorable for the train as the railroad
roadbeds are improved to the point whe re the Metroliner can realize its
full 150 mph potential. Thus in determining the modal developments of
the future, the theoretically fastest mode may be supplanted by another
which offers competitive travel time with perhaps greater comfort and
less expense.
Modal Interface
The interface between existing transportation modes is an area where
much needs to be done. People who would use public mass transportation
of all sorts often fail to do so because they cannot park their cars at
their nearest station, nor can they walk because of the distance involved.
Thus they drive to work. Flying from point to point in megalopolis areas
is often frustrating as pointed out above because of long surface and en
route delays. In most cases in the United States and abroad, airports
are located far from the cities they serve or if close in, hive poor
surface transportation interfaces, making the city-airport travel on
both ends of a flight ^. time-consuming and frustrating exercise. When
terminal delays at both ends of the flight are added, it is easy to
understand the logic of the slogan "time to spare? go by air!"
International Air Travel
The growth of the Pacific Ba:.in has important implications for air
travel. Infrastructure requirements will mount much faster in this
region than in others, particularly because existing levels of infra-
structure reflect the recent and frequently continuing poverty of many
regions of the Pacific Basin. Demand for air transport of valuable
electronics, art, perishable foods, and many other categories of mer-
chandise, is likely to continue to rise even faster than trade itself
as facilities for air transport improve and as the possibilities of air
transport become visible to broader spectrums of merchants. "Passenger
travel in the region has been growing at a rate of 27% a year, sharply
higher than the 7% a year in Europe, for example."" Rising revenues for
Asian air lines are listed in Table XV.
"Seth Lipsky, "Asia Fastens the Seat-Belt," Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 14, 1975, P . 53•
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Table X11
NTRA--AS I AN REVENUE ON
TON-KILOMETRE BASIS
AVERAGE 5-YR. GROWTH
1968-73
` (PERCENT)
AIR VIETNAM 10
CHINA AIRLINES 37
CATHAY PACIFIC 23
GARUDA 19
JAPAN AIRLINES 21
KOREAN AIRLINES 106
MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM 69	 (EST.)
PHILIPPINES AIRLINES 14
QANTAS 13
SINGAPORE AIRLINES 69*
THAI	 INTERNATIONAL 24
GROWTH FROM MSA.
SOURCE: ORIENT AIRLINES ASSOCIATION.
As the volume of East and Southeast Asian traffic rises it will
gradually come to approximate the intensity of air traffic in Europe,
and the intense competition within the region is likely to ensure that
costs per mile drop to roughly intra-European and transatlantic rates.
This drop in costs should in turn accelerate use of aircraft. Eventually
we anticipate that this inten=se, competitive, long-range Pacific Basin
air traffic will provide the principal justification for building an
SST. The huge distances involved in Pacific travel imply huge losses
of time for executives who must commute from the United States to Asia,
from Japan to Australia, and so forth. Typically the executives whose
time is lost are highly paid men to whom the day or two wasted in trans--
Pacific flight is worth several times the current price of an air ticket.
Thus, as prosperity multiplies the numbers of such executives and
increases their salaries, the pressure for more rapid travel will even-
tually become overwhelming----unless Pacific Basin growth is disrupted
over a long period of time by a serious depression, or unless some
ecological or other argument of great force absolutely prohibits SST
development, or makes it prohibitively costly.
i
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IV. WORLD FUTURES
Most Probable Future, 1980-2000
Our best estimate of the world, 1980.2000, is that presented in
the preceding pages, which can be summarized as follows.
1. Demographic Prospects for the United States include
development of megalopolises, lower population densities,
decentralized cities, satellite cities, rebuilt inner
cities, sunbelt shift, decline of some areas..
2. Development of Megalopolises in the U.S. and developed
world should proceed apace as the trend toward suburban
living continues (despite predicted reversals from some
quarters). Satellite cities should develop to service
far flung suburbs while central city areas are rebuilt
to meet changing requirements. Transportation facilities,
rail, road and air should develop and expand to meet
requisite needs.
Sunbelt Shift in the U.S. will promote development of
presently sparcely populated areas such as the Southern
Piedmont, Southwest, Northern Florida. Other quaternary
areas such as the Colorado Rockies, New England and
California mountains, beach and lake areas grow because
of their recreational potential.
3. Decline Sets In in other areas such as old seaports, old
coal and iron mining areas, the Great Plains, the Southern
black belt as their utility declines in the face of change.
Changing shipping methods. mechanized farming and mining
methods will create population flow towards developing
areas, largely in the sunbelt.
4. Population Growth rates have been increasing at a much
slower rate than many had predicted in the past and have
begun to decline in many areas, including the U.S. and
much of the West. It appears that we may be approaching
(if we haven't already reached) an inflection point in
the population growth curve. If the trend continues the
long range effect will be stabilization of population on
a worldwide basis. This is not likely to occur by the
year 2000, but the trend should be well established and
the phantom of world overpopulation and overconsumption
of resources laid to rest.
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5. The Super - industrial Society should continue to develop
and expand as the shift from primary and secondary to
tertiary and quaternary industries continues, with Post-
industrial societies emerging in the U.S, and elsewhere
toward the end of the time period. This will be accom-
panied by an accelerated industrialization of developing
countries as multinational corporations grow and expand
their operations abroad, stimulating local economies
and developing trained labor pools.	 r.
Because the principal, worldwide, social, and economic
phenomenon will be the spread of the superindustrial
society, the principal value changes will be in.the
direction of industrial values. Hard work, hierarchical 	 1
organization and saving will be the principal economic
values. Likewise because most of the world will consist
of nations which are consolidating their nationalism for
the first time the principal political value will be
nationalism. Despite this in the most advanced societies,
namely the U.S., Europe, and Japan, there will be influen-
tial groups, including most of the intelligentsia and the
media which will espouse post-economic values and inter--
nationalist or sub-nationalist loyalties.
;'
Radical Political Changes are not anticipated on any
significant scale. "Third World" countries are expected
to become gradually richer through sale of resources and
concomitant industrialization. General prosperity should
prevent the rise to power of radical elements in most
instances. At the same time, however, the new prosperity
may lead to arms races which could in turn result in
local wars in various parts of the world.
6. GNP Growth in the U.S. and the world should continue, but
at a slightly slower pace. The U.S. should continue its
j	 historic 3 percent yearly growth rate for much of the period
while the world rate should average about 5.5 percent through
1985 and decline to about 5 percent after that. World trade
should increase at a faster rate than GNP. By 1985, the
icrthest out one may predict with reasonable assurance, the
22 leading countries in the world in terms of GNP might look
as follows, within perhaps plus or minus 20 percent.
i
$2000 Billion - United States
1000 Billion - Japan and U.S.S.R.
500 Billion - France and W. Germany
250 Billion - China, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom
120 Billion - Brazil, India, Mexico, E. Germany, Poland
60 Billion - Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Australia,
Argentina, Iran, and perhaps Switzerland
and Indonesia
-	 ; 1^
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Today, 30 percent of the world population lives in "rich"
countries, while 70 percent live in "poor." Applying
present day standards, by the year 2000, 66 percent of the
world population should live in rich countries and only
33 percent in poor. This ratio might more realistically
by 70:;0.
7. Pacific Basin Growth should accelerate dramatically with
Japan, the U.S. and possibly Brazil) as spark plugs.
Improvements in transportation, communications, serve as
catalysts. Tourism should expand greatly. Growth in the
region could be explosive, with accompanying problems,
but long term prospects look good.
8. International Relations should stabilize as the U.S. and
S.U. normalize their relationship and bury cold war dif-
ferences. This does not imply entente, since basic
political and economic philosophies still differ, but
neither nation is apt to be seen as determined to dominate
the world. U.S. relations with Chia may also tend toward
normalization, but probably to a lesser degree. China and
the Soviet Union will probably remain at loggerheads for
the foreseeable future but no major armed confrontation is
anticipated. Local unrest in various parts of the world
remains probable throughout most of the period, however.
9. No major War is anticipated for the period but numerous
small wars are likely as developing nations experience
growing pains. Thus no major peace is expected either.
The possibility of large stale confrontation will continue,
however, and could develop from
Mid-East conflict
Change in the international position of Japan
Disintegration of India as a nation or of NATO's
southern flank
Communist takeovers in Italy, Spain and/or Portugal.
10. U.S. Defense Spending should continue at the present level
in terms of percent of GNP, or at about 5.6 percent. Recent
trends have been toward greater personnel expenditures at
the expense of new equipment and R&D. This will probably
stabilize and swing back the other way as technological
advances tend to reduce unit and upkeep costs for equipment,
freeing more money for R&D.
11. Resources should prove quite adequate, with no serious
shortages developing. New sources coupled with more
efficient use of raw materials and development.ofsub-
stitutes 'should assure very adequate supplies. Fears
ff
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of new cartels forming after the manner of OPEC should
prove unfounded because of the ..ide dispersion of most
resources coupled with market conditions. OPEC itself
should decline in effectiveness rather rapidly and most
probably will dissolve or become meaningless in the next
decade as new petroleum sources develop and come on line
and substitutes become economically competitive.
12. World Energy Prices should decline over time as oil pro-
duction increases in non--OPEC areas and new energy sources
are developed. Increased utilization of coal, other cheap
fuels should also lower prices, but probably not to the
1972 levels.
13. Air Transport growth is expected to average about 9 percent
annually for the next quarter century, a ten-fold increase
in revenue passenger miles by the year 2000. Availability
of discretionary income and projected increases in business
and leisure travel and in tourism are the root causes. This
is roughly consonant with the ICAO projections for the period,
although arrived at by a different methodology. It is con-
siderably below the level which would be reached if historic
growth trends were to continue.
i
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Less Probable Futures of Consequence
The above discussions constitute a best estimate of the future
environment of aviation. As has been discussed, predicting future
developments is at best a very 11 iffy" exercise. A great number of
developments might take place, any one of which or any combination of
Which could drastically alter the course of the future. Some of these
are listed below, in random order. 	 r'
E
Significant changes in GWP
More cartels form; resource prices escalate
Collapse of the oil cartel
Increased sale of military aircraft
Brush fire wars in critical areas:
Mid-East
Southeast Asia
Korea
Africa
South America
Major political changes:
China
India/Pakistan
Mid-East
Russia
Europe
Japan
Southeast Asia
United States
Further dramatic oil price increases
Ecological crises--Ozone layer, etc.
Widespread famine
a
Widespread plague
Major technological developments
New synthetic materials
"cheap" fuels
New propulsion means
New transport means
,Zeppelins	 3
Giant surface effect craft
Low boys
Major new weapons
Death rays
Long range lasers
Super-accurate missiles of all sorts
"Doomsday" devices
ti
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High level of international tension--mobilization
Large scale quantitative and qualitative arms race (worldwide)
World depression
Great prosperity
Surprise solutions.to pr.esent.development obstacles
Ideological revulsion against technology--"Limits to Growth"
philosophy
Ideological hostility against government, industry, growth,
technology, taxation, etc. .
It is obvious that occurrence of one of these could logically entrain
others for a cumulative effect which would probably be much greater than
individual effects. For example, a major political change, say a revo-
lution in China, could bring about a major level of international tension
leading to general mobilization on the part of several countries. This,
in turn, could i-ad to formation of new cartels as suppliers take advan-
tage of the situation, which could in turn lead to military action in
critical areas as countries seek to secure their supply cf critical
materials, and so on. Similarly, dramatic new oil price increases could
lead to formation of new cartels, leading to overall resource price
escalation, which-could bring about a significant downward shift in GWP,
which could cause a world depression, bringing about widespread famine,
which in turn--etc. Thus there are an infinite number of events which
could trigger dramatic departures from ghat we have indicated is our
best estimate of the probable course of events for the next 25 years.
Examining the above list of possibilities, certain ones appear to
stand out. These include both optimistic and pessimistic possibilities,
such. as:
High level of international tension
Mobilization
Large scale quantitative and qualitative arms race
Material shortages
Major technological developments
Surprise solutions to present development obstacles
General prosperity
It is clear that a high level of international tension would have
the effect of stimulating the defense industries of the countries
involved. With the possibility of hostilities present, governments
would of necessity examine their nations' combat readiness and take
steps to ensure that they would be in the strongest possible position
in the event of the outbreak of fighting. In the process, major funds
would be directed to the defense establishment and R&© efforts would
be stepped up across the board. The duration of the tension would
i	 :I
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naturally determine the degree t, which such stepped-up activities would
be pursued, but once programs were started many or most of them would
probably be carried by inertia and by economic considerations that would
militate against writing off the investment already made if results
appeared probable in a reasonable time period.
In the event of mobilization, which traditionally is the last step
before outbreak of hostilities, it seems reasonable to assume that the
nations concerned would shift to a war footing and focus every effort
on preparing for the outbreak of hostilities. This would result in
establishment of crash weapons development and improvement programs on
which few financial restrictions would be imposed, within the limit of
available funding. Here again, R&D of all types would increase as major
efforts were expended to plug gaps in weapon capability. Whether or not
war actually occurred, if the state of mobilization were of long duration,
R&D efforts would be significantly stimulated and an end of the crisis
short of war would again find many projects too far along to be summarily
cancelled. It is probable that in either of the above events, a state
of tension would continue to exist far beyond the defusing of the
specific crises which brought them about, as was the case with the
Korean War outbreak in 1950, which resulted in a major modernization
of U.S. weapons systems, in particular the air force.
A large scale qualitative and quantitative arms race could result
from a number of developments which might fall short of either of the
first two possibilities. Nervousness or over-reaction of a major power
to a crisis might be sufficient to trigger such a race which once started,
would be hard to stop as each side played catch-up in reaction to advances
by the other. Reestablishment of the cold war could also trigger such a
race, as could depressed economic conditions or the ascension to power of
a paranoid personality in a major nation, i.e., a new Hitler or Stalin.
Material shortages could come about as a result of cartel actions,
other market developments or a de facto "Limits to Growth" situation
where it is discovered that critical resources are really in short supply
and will soon run out. Whatever the cause, the effect would be similar.
If the shortage was of a critical material, such as petroleum or alumi-
num, a major R&D effort would be required to develop substitutes. Since
in such an event the entire economy and modus vivendi of the developed
nations of the world would be affected, it is reasonable to assume that
every effort would be made to find a solution.
.Major technological developments would also have a significant
effect, the degree and direction depending on the nature of the develop-
ment. Historic examples are not hard to find. Invention of the auto-
mobile assembly line put the nation on wheels and created a major indus-
try. The computer revolutionized industry and opened up possibilities
undreamed of prior to its invention. Sputnik precipitated the space
56
race and all the fall-outs resulting therefrom. Thus it is n ot hard to
imagine a similar development in the next quarter century, altnough what
form it might take and what the results might be is a Iittle more diffi-
cult. Should such an event occur, however, it would certainly act as a
significant spur to many fields.
The next example, surprise solutions to present development obstacles,
is somewhat similar, since it implies some sort of technological break-
through, but here it focuses on known situations. A cheap new fuel might
prove the solution to the current energy crisis, for example, sparking
major research efforts to develop or adapt equipment to utilize it. A
viable means of cheaply harnessing solar energy would also have wide-
spread effects on the industrial world and would stimulate the develop-
ment of practical uses for the new energy source.
In a situation of great prosperity, everything benefits, not least
R&D. With rapid economic growth, availability of work reduces welfare
requirements and promotes general well-being. Socially oriented programs
would tend to lose their emphasis as the perceived need for such programs
faded. Emphasis would be on development and expansion of industry and
strong market competition would spur development of new products. Con-
sumer demand would create a large-scale, worldwide increase in the numbers
of people who could afford air travel for business, family, or touristic
reasons, spurring the development of improved aircraft to meet new air-
line requirements in every category of size and range. Ecological con-
siderations would loom even larger as the economy expanded, bringing
about redesign and replacement of much equipment which contributes to
pollution but with which we must presently live for economic reasons.
With funds available, the Defense Department would move to modernize
military equipment and developments presently seen to be far down the
road would probably be advanced in time. Thus all aspects of develop-
ment, military and civilian, would benefit.
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A Stagnation or Erosion Future
The most pessimistic RSD outcomes are not those which would result
from sudden or immense disaster but from what we might label "the erosion
of the West." This erosion scenario can best be summarized by simply
referring to the differences from the best estimate scenario.
In the erosion scenario the world does not go into an immediate deep
depression but "stagflation"* persists and deepens. The U.S. and Western
Europe and most of the Pacific Basin fail to solve their major economic
problems and as a result find themselves locked into stop-and-go policies
and failure of growth similar to that which Britain has experienced in the
last decade. High rates of inflation are attacked by policies which lead
to high unemployment; as soon as inflation begins to abate slightly the
various= economies are reflated at a speed which reduces unemployment
rapidly but restarts the fires of inflation. Public confidence in indus-
try and government declines further and further and left-wing regimes
take over in France, Italy and Japan. These regimes make international
cooperation much more difficult but make no more progress than their
predecessors in solving the basic economic problems. In the Pacific
Basin, instead of having a group of economies which fuel each other in
the manner of a firestorm, one finds interdependence among stagnant,
inflating economies dragging all the countries of the region down in
a vicious circle. The principal airlines and shipbuilders of the region,
caught by the momentum of a decade of extraordinary expansion, find them-
selves facing bankruptcy because of excessive capacity. In the less
developed world, food shortages become chronic instead of being allevi-
ated, and birth rates, which were beginning to decline because of the
demographic transition that occurs with increasing prosperity, instead
begin to climb once again and these higher birth rates aggrevate low
incomes and food shortages.
Throughout the world the concept of progress through saving and
technology becomes increasingly discredited, and the ideology of empha-
sizing redistribution rather than growth as a solution to world poverty
which began to coalesce as a major ideology among the developing nations
during the early 1970s becomes dominant throughout the non-communist
world. Lack of growth makes it difficult to cope with pollution and
other problems of industrial society and as , a result the "limits to
growth" ideology becomes more and more widespread. Thus slow growth
leads to attitudes which impede growth still further and exercise par-
ticularly strong inhibitions against emphasis. on technology as a solu-
tion to man's problems.
*The term stagflation refers to the present economic situation in
the U.S. and the Western world in which inflation continues in an economy
which has become stagnant. This is not in consonance with historic trends
in which depression has resulted when the economy ceases to grow.
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A Prosperous Future
In an unexpectedly prosperous world recovery from the current period
of stagflation would be unexpectedly quick and subsequent economic growth
rates would be unexpectedly rapid. Japan would return to its previous
growth rates of 10 to 12 percent per annum and carry with it South Korea,
Taiwan, along Kong and Singapore at similar rates of growth and most of
Southeast Asia at rates above 6 percent per annum. Much of Western
Europe would grow at 6 to 7 percent per annum and the United States would
grow at an annual rate of 5 percent or better. The developing nations
would take on an optimistic perspective and emphasize growth first, for
the sake of redistribution later. In the developed nations growth would
provide the resources to cope with pollution and would provide the funds
for technological change which would solve many of the key noise, pollu-
tion, and social issues which had previously justified the spread of
anti-industrialist, anti-growth, and anti-technological attitudes. Rapid
economic and technological progress would ensure high morale and support
high defense budgets throughout most of the non-communist world and thus
provide the strength to ensure continuation of detente with the Soviet
Union. Growth would fund technological progress and geological explora-
tion as a result rapidly relieve the United States and more gradually
the rest of the world from excessive dependence upon OPEC petroleum, thus
diffusing another major source of possible international strife. A com-
bination of diffuse high morale and specific technological successes
would dissipate the anti-technological fervor that was tending to spread
throughout the west 16 the early 1970s.
r'
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A Desperation Future
A deep depression could cause civil unrest in Europe, Japan, South-
east Asia and elsewhere. The Soviet union could perceive such disarray
as an opportunity to spread its influence or hegemony and a return to
a period of intense military tension would occur. This military tension
could be expressed not only by great power rhetoric and specific Preat
power confrontations, but also by specific conflict and outbreaks of
warfare in the developing world and in Europe. in consequence, military
budgets would skyrocket and R&D would be emphasized as a necessity for
survival. Technological change, particularly in high technology indus-
tries, would proceed at rates comparable to those which occurred during
World War ll and in the middle of the cold war.
Under these game scenarios any sense of international cooperation
would be minimized and deliberate trouble-making would be maximized.
Opponents might very well attempt to disrupt one another's trade and
Soviet encouragement of the formation of cartels and of a Third World
emphasi, on retaining natural resources as a natural patrimony could
be expected. Because of intense fear of resource shortages, with or
without the actual occurrence of such shortages, intense research and
development would be devoted to finding substitutes for scarce or
politically vulnerable materials. The emphasis would be on those
materials vital to national defense, including energy and the metals
vital to high technology industries.
The Prospects for Foreign Competition
We would be surprised to see the United States lose its dominant
position in the West in aerospace, electronics and other forms of high
technology by 2000. Probably the Soviets will be our main competition,
and the Japanese may have some effect; but we would be dubious of the
competitive viability of the West European industries. This view is
based on a combination of post World War II trends and a perception of
the European attitude toward;_ technology.
We take as a measure of national aerospace attitudes, the status
of the national military aerospace industry. A very good measure of
that industry, since 1945, has been the will and the ability to pro`,.:ce
independently fighter aircraft of modern design. The requirement ki
such aircraft--usually for interceptors--has been universal, and doe,.
not carry the emotional cargo associated with sophisticated bombers.
At the same time an interceptor requires for its design and production
the most sophisticated aerospace products; only a healthy industry can
produce a good fighter. To some extent this view of fighters as indi-
cators of the prestige and power of aerospace industries is confirmed
by the actions of a number of the lesser powers. At various times
since 1945, Argentina, Egypt, India, and Spain have regarded native
fighter-production capability as an important measure of national pres-
tige.
r	 -!
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In 1945 virtually every nation in Western Europe had the independent
capacity to design and build fighters. The design process was relatively
simple, and construction was cheap. The maintenance of an independent
military aircraft R&D establishment entailed no great sacrifices. One
might say that the cost of entry into the aerospace arms industry was
low. Each country has attained a substantial manufacturing capacity,
but that has been used to manufacture aircraft of foreign--often U.S.--
conception. Choices between indigenous capacity and economy seem gener-
ally to have been decided in favor of economy, as long as the numbers of
factory jobs remain.
As this capacity has been allowed to die, the initial cost of start-
ing up a serious military aircraft industry has risen. Decisions which
may have seemed quite temporary have become less and less reversible.
A good illustration of this cost phenomenon may be Japan's efforts to
produce her own combat aircraft. Her own quite modest lightweight fighter
has virtually prices itself out of her military budget, although she is
still able to buy U.S. Phantoms.
One can see similar trends in other arms industries requiring a
high research investment. Most European effort has gone into the
development of relatively simple tactical missiles, a notable export
success being the French Exocet naval missile.
To these countries we must contrast the Soviets. Quite obviously
the Soviets, however expensive or ineffective their weapons, cannot buy
U.S, equipment. They must maintain a powerful indigenous capacity,
which means that for the foreseeable future they will probably be our
chief competitors in selling aerospace products to the neutral world.
Until very recently the Soviets have regarded such sales as a way
of influencing the buyers. They have often very nearly given away equip-
ment made surplus by their huge production runs. At the same time their
product has been unattractive to potential paying customers because of
serious inadequacies in post-sales support: there has, for example,
been no serious Western market for Soviet airliners. This may no longer
be entirely the case. For example, the Soviets have made strenous
efforts to market their recent commercial aircraft in non-Communist
countries; but inherent deficiencies continue at present to plague them
(e.g., Egyptian dissatisfaction with the TU 154)."
The Soviet Union has, and for quite some time is likely to have, an
underdeveloped civilian economy in great need of hard foreign currency.
Her major manufactured export beyond her own client states is arms, and
recently she has begun to ask realistic prices for this product, as
r	 -- 1
Aviation Week, 16 December 1974, P. 13.
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during the October (1973) war. If the Soviets can succeed in depoliti-
cizing this product, we can expect them to try very hard to see] it at
commercial prices throughout the neutral or semi-neutral world.
Of course, the Soviet military industry provides them a base for
the development of commercial aircraft; and here we are beginning to
see serious sales activity. An interesting correlate of such attempts
may be a decline in the security-mania of the Soviet military.
These are all trends which are only beginning in 1975, but we
would expect them to be well established by 2000. That is:
In most countries the choice of high-technology products will be
U.S. vs. Soviet. Europeans will participate heavily in high-technology
programs, but they will initiate few of them; one might take some of
the IBM projects as prototypes. The lower the entry cost, the better
the chance that a class of indigenous R&D will exist in a European
nation, but European governments are likely to be most interested in
the manufacturing end of high technology...
However, certain countries, for reasons of prestige, will attempt
to maintain entirely indigenous high technology industries. Probably
such attempts will involve such denials of technological reality as
protected (if inferior) arms industries.
The Japanese are a separate, and ambiguous, case. Japan has deempha-
sized military and aerospace technology for a generation, but has demon-
strated high and increasing capability to produce high technology.
Presently they manufacture, but do not devote much effort to developing,
aerospace technology. Superficially this resembles the European pattern,
but the superficiality of the resemblance is crucial, for in other areas
the Japanese have demonstrated the will and creativity to develop their
own products, and even to exceed the U.S. in key areas, whereas the
Europeans generally have not. Nonetheless, because of the long lead-
times involved in creating a base for aerospace research and development,
because of the continuing inhibitions on most military research, and
because Japanese sensitivity about exporting armaments increases their
net RED costs, the Japanese are unlikely to be major competitors of the
U.S. before the end of the century.
'That is, the less government effort is required, the better the
chance that some private company will go into high technology. Hence
one would expect a decline in European technology as European economies
became socialized, as may occur in the U.K. This would be a cultural,
not in fact an economic, phenomenon. The most likely way of reversing
such a trend would be a strong anti-U.S. and pan-European political
movement, i.e., a national combination which would have no choice but
to support strong indigenous R&D. Such a combination seems unlikely at
present.
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V. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON AVIATION GROWTH
During the course of the study a number of factors have been identi-
fied which should have an effect on the future growth of aviation. In
this section some of these are examined. For purposes of discussion
they have been divided into three basic categories: those which should
have the effect of promoting aviation growth; those which might tend to
restrain growth; and those which should affect the future of aviation
but which do not clearly fall into either of the above categories.
1. Factors Promoting Growth
Growth of the Pacific Basin--As has been discussed, the anticipated
growth in the Pacific Basin over the next 25 years should have a signifi-
cant impact on aviation growth. In addition to the obvious increase in
air travel fostered by the spectacular growth in tourism in the region
and the dramatic increase in air freight, the market for all kinds of
aircraft, from transports to agricultural aircraft should be significant.
As oil exploration expands in the area, for example, helicopters are
increasingly required to service off-shore rigs and remote exploration
sites. As commerce and industry expand, so does the demand for business
aircraft. While some home-grown aircraft manufacturing may be antici-
pated, notably in Brazil, the U.S. aviation industry can expect the
lion's share of the new business since we build better aircraft in most
categories and generally sell them for less. Even in the case of Brazil,
U.S, manufacturers benefit by assisting in development of local indus-
tries which manufacture U.S. designs under license. In view of the cost
of design and development of new aircraft, this pattern may be expected
to continue in those countries which attempt to develop their own aviation
industries.
Intercity Transportation--With the growth of megalopolises in the
U.S. and the concomitant growth in travel among and within the city
centers, growth of supplementary transportation systems may be .xper_ted.
One of the more obvious approaches would be utilization of STOL or
V/STOL aircraft operating from STOL strips at or near city centers. One
such system operates between Montreal and Ottawa at present and provides
city center to city center service which is significantly better than
competing modes." Development of such a system within the Northeast
corridor, for example, would itself create a significant market for STOL
Total travel time, door to door between comparable downtown hotels
in each city, involved 2 hours 35 minutes by bus, 2 hours 24 minutes by
train, 2 hours 20 minutes by automobile, 2 hours by conventional aircraft
(DC-9 with a 30 minute block time between existing airports) and less than
90 minutes by an Airtransit Twin Otter (with 45 minutes block time between
STOL ports)." Davidson, Vic, "Canadian STOL-Commuter Service Demonstrates
Early Success," ICAO Bulletin, December, 1974, p. 14.
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transport aircraft which could provide a highly competitive alternative
to existing systems such as the Eastern Airlines Shuttle and the Metro-
liner. Ccntinued development of wise-bodied, short-range aircraft of
the Lockheed 1011 variety for intercity and inter-megalopolis utilization
may also be anticipated, as travel demand grows and existing facilities
prove inadequate... increased utilization of business aircraft may also be
expected, particularly as industry continues its trend toward decentrali-
zation of facilities and relocation in suburban areas.
Population and Economic Growth--As has been discussed, we believe
that the rate of increase of population growth in the United States is
turning downward and may have already --ached or dropped below the no-
growth point. It was also pointed out, hot-ever, that the population will
continue to increase despite this until the present bulge advances peat
the child-bearing age (Figure 2). This will not occur before the er,d of
the century. Thus an increasing population will require more transporta-
tion facilities of all types, including aviation. When this is coupled
with the expanding economy, with its accompanying increase in personal
disposable income, it is clear that there will be an increase in the
demand for services of all sorts, including transportation. Economic
growth should thus promote growth in the aviation industry as demand
increases for all types of aircraft from small private planes to large
transports.
Defense--The impact of defense considerations on the aviation
industry has been discussed. Despite the ongoing detente, it is highly
unlikely that defense spending, and aviation's proportion thereof, will
decline in the next 25 years. Events in Southeast Asia serve to under-
score this. It is quite possible, if not probable, that a dramatic
increase in defense spending may develop in the future as a result of
communist gains in various parts of the world and the perceived danger
to our security relating thereto. Thus Sir Robert Thompson,, in reference
to Congressional refusal to vote more aid for South Vietnam., "How, for
the sake of $1 billion or $2 billion it will cost the United States $50
billion to $100 billion more annually in defense costs if credibility
is to be restored." * This is probably an extreme view, but the trend
suggested remains a possibility, although not necessarily at the levels
predicted. Thus is seems likely that defense requirements will continue
to stimulate the aviation industry for the next quarter century.
Desperation--The Desperation World scenario was discussed earlier
and its effects on aviation highlighted. Although this would be a very
unpleasant world in which to live, it would prove very stimulative to
aviation, especially in connection with military technology and research.
in such a world the industry, in common with other defense-oriented
industries, would be operating under what would amount to wartime con-
ditions in terms of emphasis on production and development. Civil
*Thompson, Robert, "Retreat," Op. Ed. Page, The New York Times,
April 3, 1975. Of.course, there is serious doubt that another $1 or $2
billion would have been enough to maintain the credibility of U.S. com-
mitment.
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aviation growth would probably not be markedly enhanced and might indeed
be restricted, but the growth on the military side would probably more
than offset any losses in civil aviation growth.
Developments--Some of the developments which might lead to an
increase in aviation growth have been discussed in some detail. Thus
they will be listed here as indicative of the.type of occurrences which,
while often highly undesirable otherwise, would probably lead to a marked
expansion of the aviation industry.
High level of international tension
Mobilization
Large-scale quantitative and qualitative arms race
Material shortages
Major technological developments
Surprise solutions to present development obstacles
General prosperity
Agriculture--it seems reasonable to expect that as developing nations
expand their agricultural production the airplane will become increasingly
important, both for distribution and for spraying. As new agricultural
methods are introduced in developing nations, large-scale cooperative
farming operations often develop to take maximum advantage of economies
of size. in such cases, traditional hand methods of sowing, weeding,
fertilizing and harvesting generally must be discarded. Use of modern
farming equipment is often limited because of cost, inability to properly
operate and maintain the equipment and, frequently, terrain character-
istics which limit such use. Aircraft, however, can often do the bulk
of the necessary jobs, freeing available manpower to handle those tasks
which cannot be done from the air. The versatility, relatively low cost
and tremendous productivity of aircraft, both in the dusting and logistics
roles, would appear to assure a profitable future for the light aircraft
industry in the years to come. This optimism does not, of course, mean
that aircraft will soon become profitable for high density crops like
rice in the extremely poor areas (China, India, etc.) which constitute
most of the third and fourth worlds, except as means of distributing
the produce where the existing transportation infrastructure is inadequate
for the job.
Weather Modif ication--The impact of weather modification on aviation
is somewhat ind i rect but could prove significant. If means of dissipating
fog are developed, for example, it could result in elimination or drastic
reduction in down time for airports in areas subject to fog. Means of
diverting or limiting snow and hail could have similar results, as could
hurricane diversion or modification. In addition, development of weather
modification techniques could create new uses for aircraft perhaps result-
ing in new designs and production of :significant numbers of weather
modification aircraft. Such techniques would probably spread quite
rapidly, particularly in developing countries with food shortage problems,
creating a worldwide mar E.et for weather modification aircraft.
Civilian aviation requirements are likely to have a beneficial
effect on aviation, especially in a climate of prosperity. Emphasis is
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likely to be placed on development of quieter, cleaner, more economical
and efficient power plants. New materials and construction techniques
are also apt to be highlighted as cost reducing factors. Automation of
airway traffic control systems is another probability, coupled with
development of cheaper, more efficient and more re1i.able.avionics com-
ponents for the general aviation market. STOL and V/STDL developments
are very likely to come along in the next few years, creating new markets
and expanding existing ones. Air cushion vehicles, while not strictly
aircraft, are Iikely to be developed and produced by aviation firms and 	 r
their future appears rather br ; ght as obstacles to their design and
development are overcome. 	 a
2. Factors Constraining. Growth
,lust as there . are foreseen factors which should tend to promote
aviation growth, there are some which might tend to have the opposite
effect. Some of these are briefly discussed below.
Decline in development and production might be brought about by a
general and prolonged economic recession or depression or by long-term
economic stagnation which produce close to a zero growth rate. In such
a situation the general effect would be to cut back on all unessential
activities and to ride out the storm as well as possible. Should such
an economic climate persist for a protracted period, it would doubtless
have a long term depressing effect on aviation development and would
probably seriously damage the in6istry. in this environment it is hard
to foresee any significant progress being made.
Institutional Factors which could adversely affect the aviation
industry might include increased and repressive government regulation
which could stifle the industry. The ascendance of a "limits to growth"
philosophy might result in imposed restrictions on the degree and type of
development which would be permitted, which could have the effect of
reducing new developments to the vanishing point. Basic changes in the
U.S. political/economic structure, e.g., a shift. from traditional support
for investment, research and development, and increases in productivity,
to an increased emphasis on redistribution and social welfare, could
retard economic progress and lead to a decline in the aviation industry
as well as others. (Such a shift can take place with or without increased
direct government control of the economy.)
Material shortages could have a very restrictive effect on aviation
growth if substitutes could not be developed. The most obvious is a
shor'""age of fuel, which could seriously curtail flying activities of all
sorts. Materials critical to aircraft production, such as metals, min-
erals, fibers, petro-chemical products could also prove restrictive to
development if in short supply, if no viable substitutes were to be
developed. Such shortages might be produced by sour 	 restrictions,
by diversion of available supplies to other use areas, or by cartel
actions designed to force prices up. Whatever the cause, the effect
could be extremely deleterious to aviation development.
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Improved Ground Transport might well lead to a reduction in the
aircraft market through provision of cheaper and/or more efficient
transportation. Thus improvements in existing mass transit systems
such as the Metroliner in the Northeast Corridor might lead to a decline
in systems such as the Boston-New York-Washington Air Shuttle. New
systems might be developed and superimposed on the existing transporta-
tion infrastructure with the same effect as development of high speed
hydrofoils and surface effect machines. Development of automated high-
ways, making it possible to travel long distance rapidly and safely in
	
r
private automobiles could also adversely affect aviation growth. Although
it is not likely that surface transportation will seriously challenge
long haul aviation, especially for passenger movement, it is possible
that much of the short and medium haul market could be captured by future
surface transportation developments.
3. Other Factors Affecting U.S. Aviation
There are several other factors which might affect U.S, aviation
development in a manner less easy to identify than the above; i.e., they
could produce either adverse or beneficial results, depending on the
way in which they developed. Three of these are discussed below.
Foreign Competition could prove to be either a stimulus or a seri-
ous challenge to the U.S. aviation industry. Although the U.S. presently
dominates the world civil aviation market and more than holds its own
in the military, this could change in the future either because of com-
petition developing in the Western world, the communist world or both.
It doesn't appear that such competition will develop to the point where
the U.S. industry could be seriously hurt, but rapid expansion of world
markets could lead to expansion of foreign industries to fill the void
which limits to U.S. production couldn't fill, thus creating a compati- 	 a
tine base which presently doesn't exist. It is also possible that
another country could achieve a major technological or production break-
through which would enable it to corner a significant portion of the
market before the U.S. industry could develop a matching capacity. A
third possibility is a major effort by communist countries, Russia in
particular, to undercut U.S, market dominance by flooding the market
with cheap but good aircraft of various types which would significantly
undersell competitive U.S. models. Such a possibility becomes more
likely if the technology transfer trend develops, affording the Russians
technological capabilities they presently lack. A precedent exists in
the automotive field where Fiat constructed auto plants in Russia and
trained Russian workers in their operation. Today Russian-built Fiats
undersell Italian versions in several European and African markets.
On the other hand, competition has historically promoted industrial
expansion and product improvement and there is no reason to believe that
this wouldn't continue to be the case in the aviation industry. Develop-
ment of significant foreign competition might very well prove a stimulus
to U.S. aviation, promoting the growth of the industry.
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Ecology has become increasingly significant of recent years and has
had a market effect on the aviation industry. Thus the focus on cleaner,
quieter, more efficient power plants, the demise of the U.S. SST and the
current efforts to ban foreign SSTs from U.S. airports and airways.
Here too it is difficult to say what will be the long!-term effects of
ecological considerations on the aviation industry. That they can be
restrictive is clear from the SST and from various prohibitions to air-
craft operations which have been imposed from time to time, and place to
place. On the other hand, aviation has unquestionably advanced as a
result of such developments as more efficient and quieter power plants.
While ecological considerations might combine to produce a restrictive
effect on aviation developments (or a serious, long term effect such as
deterioration of the ozone layer in the upper atmosphere could result in
serious curtailment of flight activities), the likelihood is that as
ecological dangers are identified, technological advances will serve to
alleviate or negate them, permitting the industry to grow to meet future
demands.
Energy is clearly an area which could prove quite critical to future
developments of all kinds. If there were to develop a serious shortage
of petroleum products, for whatever reason, aviation would be adversely
affected, since it would be difficult to convert aircraft to alternatives
such ds coal synthetics or methane. Since many manufacturing facilities
are dependent on petroleum products (including natural gas), production
would also be curtailed until such time as conversion to coal could be
made or coal liquefaction and gasification techniques developed to the
point of providing for requirements. Shortages of other energy sources
could have similar effects. Development of substitute fuels, such as
hydrogen, for aircraft utilization are anticipated to take considerable
time, on the order of one to two decades. When this is coupled with the
need to design and p roduce power plants capable of using the new fuels
the time and investment required becomes very large. A serious energy
shortage could clearly cripple industry in general and aviation in
particular for the rest of this century, should it develop. On the other
hand, known reserves of all types are more 1 .jan adequate to handle pro-
jected needs well into the next century, and when new source discoveries
are added, it seems clear that de facto energy shortages, if they develop,
will be man-made. Hence they can be alleviated by appropriate action.
The most probable development in the energy picture is pursuit of Project
Independence goals to the point of U.S. energy partial self-sufficiency
within one or two decades.
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Appendix I
PACIFIC BASIN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TRENDS 1972-2000
We highlight the prospects for Pacific Basin development because
we believe that it is the area of most dynamic development for the
last quarter of the century. The large travel and transport distances
imply significant increases in aviation needs to meet the special
requirements of the area, such as the SST.
The last chart shows development in Europe and the developing
countries for comparative purposes.
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International Develo pment Proiections
This section focuses on development projections for the Pacific
Basin Trading and Investment Area. The Pacific Basin Trade and Invest-
ment Area is a functional group of "Ivey countries" contained in or
bordering on the Pacific Ocean. Included in this grouping are Venezuela
and Brazil which, while not geographically located in the Pacific Basin,
do a major portion of their trading with the PTIA and thus constitute a
significant factor in the growth and development of the region. Also
shown are projections for the China Trading Bloc and for comparison,
some European and third world projections.
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PACIFIC BASIN
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GNP/CAP, AND POP
nv rniimTov Amn Rr1_lner - AnuJllAl r-'Rnl,rru a
1-3
TION PROJECTIONS
COUNTRY/REGION 1972 % 1975 % 1980 % 1985 % 1990 °b 2000
U.S.A. GNP	 (BIL.) 1155 2.0 1225 4.5 1527 4.2 1876 4.0 2282 4.0 W8
GNP/CAP. 5532 1.5 5750 3.5 6830 3.2 7995 3.1 9315 3.2 12765
POP.(MIL.) 209 1.0 215 1.0 226 1.0 238 0.9 249 0.8 270'
JAPAN GNP 335 6.0 399 9.0 614 8.0 902 7.0 1265 6.0 2265
GNP/CAF. 3165 5.2 3685 7.9 5390 7.2 7630 6.2 10310 5.3 17280
POP. 105 1.2 110 1.1 115 0.8 120 0.8 125 0.7 135
CANADA GNP 103 3.0 113 5.0 144 5.0 184 5.0 235 5.0 383
4NP/GAP. 4696 2.1 4998 3.3 5879 3.4 6949 3.5 8253 3.6 11755
POP. 22 1.7 23 1.7 25 1.6 27 1.5 29 1.4 33
AUSTRALIA GNP 50 2.5 53.8 5.0 68.7 5.0 87.7 6.0 117.4 6.0 210.3
GNP/CAP. 3924 1.8 4140 2.9 4776 3.0 5537 4.1 6769 4.2 10214
POP. 13 2.0 14 2.1 16 2.0 18 1.9 20 1.8 25
BRAZIL GNP 49.5 6.0 59.0 8.0 86.7 8.0 127.4 8.0 187.2 8.0 404
GNP/CAP, 495 4.8 570 5.1 730 5.2 940 5.4 1222 5.7 2130
POP. 98 2.8 105 2.9 120 2.8 140 2.6 160 2.3 200
MEXICO GNP 4O 4.4 45 7.5 65 7.5 93 7.0 130 7.0 256
GNP/CAP. 750 3.0 820 4.1 1002 4.2 1230 4.0 1497 4.3 2280
POP. 53 3.4 59 3.4 70 3.3 82 3.0 95 2.7 125
INDONESIA GNP 10.6 4.0 11.9 5.5 15.6 7.0 21.9 8.0 32.2 8.0 69.5
GNP/CAP.
POP.
.SOUTH KOREA GNP 10 7.0 11.6 9.0 17.9 9.0 27.5 8.o 40.4 7.5 83.3
GNP/CAP. 294 4.8 338 6.6 465 6.7 644 6.0 862 6.o 154.4
POP.
NEW ZEALAND GNP 9.5 2.5 10.2 4.6 12.4 4.5 15.5 5.0 19.8 6.0 35.5
GNP/CAP. 3359 1.5 351'2 2.2 3915 2.6 4451 3.2 5210 4.3 7938
POP. 2.9 1.7 3. 1 1.8 3.4 1.9 3.7 1.8 4 1.7 5
PHILIPPINES GNP 8.3 5.5 9.8 5.5 12.8 6.0 17.1 6.5 23.4 7.0 46
GNP/CAP. 202 2.0 214 2.0 236 2.6 268 3.6 320 4.5 497
POP. 41 3.5 45 3.5 53 3.4 63 2.9 73 2.5 93
TAIWAN GNP 7.69 6.o 9.2 9.0 14.2 8.0 20.9 7.5 30 7.5 61.8
GNP/CAP 508 3.5 563 5.8 746 6.0 998 5.8 1323 6.2 2414
POP. 15 2.2 16 2.2 18 2.0 20 1.7 22 1.3 25
THAILAND GNP 7.7 5.0 8.9 6.5 12.2 6.5 16.7 7.0 23.4 7.0 46
GNP/CAP. 195 3.0 213 3.4 252 3.5 300 4.3 370 4.6 580
POP. 38 3.3 42 3.1 49 3.0 57 2.7 65 2.4 82
SINGAPORE GNP 2.6 g.o 3.4 9.0 5 9.0 8 8.0 12 7.0 23
GNP/CAP. 1200 6.7 1500 6.7 2200 6.9 2900 7.2 3900 5.6 6400
POP. 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.8 1.8 3.1 1.4 3.6
SOURCE OF GNP DATA: GROSS .NATIONAL PRODUCT: GROWTH RATES AND TREND DATA BY REGION AND COUNTR"
RC-N-138, MAY 1, 197+, BUREA+: OF PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, A.I.D.
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PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
BILLIONS OF 1972 $
COUNTRY	 1972
AUSTRALIA	 50.00
E INDONESIA	 10.62
JAPAN	 335.00
C	 :`
I SiNICULTURE AREA 21.00
CHINA (TAIWAN)	 7.69
I KOREA (SOUTH)	 10.00
SINGAPORE	 2.60
SOUTH VIETNAM	 3.13
E OTHER ASIA	 28.00
ESTIMATED
GROWTH
RATE M 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
3.5 55.44 65,85 78.21 92.89 131.03
5.0 57.88 73.87 94.28 120.33 196.o0
7.0 61.25 85.91 120.49 168.99 332.43
5.0 12.29 15.69 20.02 25.55 41.62
6.0 12.65 16.93 22.66 30.32 54.30
7.0 13.01 18.25 25.60 35.91 70.64
6.0 399.00 533.95 714.55 956.23 1712.46
8.0 422.00 620.00 911.00 1338.56 2889.85
10.0 445.89 718.11 1156.52 1862.59 4831.08
6.4 25.30 34.50 47.05 64.16 115.31
8.3 26.68 39.75 59-.22 88.23 195.84
10.1 28.03 45.35 73.37 118.70 310.69
6.5 9.29 12.73 17.44 23.89 44.84
8.0 9.69 14.24 20.92 30.74 66.37
9.5 10.10 15.90 25.03 39.40 97.64
7.0 12.25 17.18 24.10 33.80 66.49
9.0 12.95 19.93 30.66 47.17 111.67
11.0 13.66 23.02 38.79 65.36 185.58
7.0 3.19 4.47 6.27 8.79 17.29
9.0 3.37 5.19 7.99 12.29 29.09
11.0 3.56 6.00 10.11 17.04 48.38
3.0 3.73 4.33 5.02 5.82 7.82
4.o 3.95 4.81 5.85 7.12 10.55
5.0 4.19 5.34 6.82 8.70 14.18
11.7 3	 .14 40.44 50.88 64.ol 101.32
5.6 32.97 43.30 56.86 74.67 128.59
6.5 33.82 46.34 63.49 86.93 163.29
CONT'D
PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT - STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
1-5
I MEXICO	 40.00
I UNITED STATES	 1155.00
I VENEZUELA	 13,41
GROWTH
RATE (%) 1975 198o 1985 1990 2000
5.5 5.55 7.25 9.48 13.07 21.16
6.3 5.76 7.82 10.62 15.34 26.58
7.0 5.96 8.35 11.72 17.58 32.32
2.5 10.20 11.54 13.06 14.73 18.92
3.5 10.50 12.50 14.85 17.64 24.88
4.0 10.69 13.01 15.83 19.26 28.51
5.0 12.73 16.25 20.74 26.47 43.12
5.5 12.92 16.89 22.07 28.84 49.26
6.0 13.10 17.59 23.54 31.50 56.41
5.0 8.91 11.37 14.51 18.52 30.17
6.5 9.30 12.75 17.46 23.92 44.91
8.0 9.70 14.25 20.94 30.77 66.43
2.5 29.29 33.14 37.49 42.42 54.30
3.7 30.33 36.37 43.62 52.31 75.23
5.0 31.49 40.19 51.29 65.46 106.63
5.O 57.30 73.13 93.33 119.12 194.03
5.5 58.12 75.96 99.28 129.75 221.63
6.0 58.96 78.90 105.59 141.30 253.05
3.0 112.55 130.48 151.26 175.35 235.66
4.0 115.86 140.96 171.50 208.66 308.87
5.0 119.24 152.18 194.22 247.88 403.77
3.0 8.39 9.73 11.28 13.08 17.58
4.0 8.64 10.51 12.79 15.56 23.03
5.0 8.89 11.35 14.49 18.49 30.12
6.o 47.64 63.75 85.31 114.16 204.44
7.5 49.69 71.34 102.45 142.o4 292.75
9.0 51.80 79.70 122.63 188.68 446.67
2.0 1225.70 1353.27 1494.12 1649,62 2010.28
3.0 1262.10 1463.12 1696.16 1966.3I 2642.56
1+.0 1299.22 1580.17 1922.52 2339.04 3462.35
5.0 15.52 19.81 25.28 32.26 52.55
5.9 15.93 21,22 28.26 37.64 66.77
6,5 16.20 22.20 30.42 41.68 78.24
.BILLIONS OF 1972 $
COUNTRY	 1972
MALAYSIA	 4.25
I NEW ZEALAND	 9.50
PHILIPPINES	 11.00
i THAILAND	 7.70
I ARGENTINA	 27.20
I BRAZIL	 49.5o
i CANADA	 103.00
I CHILE	 7.68
ti
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1PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA - STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS
1975 - 2000
F
COUNTRY 1972 PROJECTION 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
AUSTRALIA 3924 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 4164 4597 5076 5604 6831
MED. GNP-MED.
	
POP. 4288 4971 5763 6661 8952
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 4674 6255 8371 11202 20061
INDONESIA 84 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 85 87 89 94 104
MED.	 GNP-MED.	 POP. 88 95 102 110 128
HIGH GNP-LOW POP, 89 98 108 119 145
,JAPAN 3165 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 3717 4858 6349 8298 14174
MED.	 GNP-MED. POP. 3987 5858 8607 ,12647 27304
HIGH GNP--LOW POP. 4259 6985 11455 18532 48506
SINICULTURE AREA 283 GNP-HIGH POP. 338 405 490 617 903
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 372 491 653 926 1698
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 409 595 873 1395 3281
CHINA (TAIWAN) 508 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 571 695 846 1029 1523
MED.	 GNP-MED. POP. 605 810 1084 1451 2599
HIGH GNP -LOW POP. 640 940 1381 2096 4827
KOREA (SOUTH) 294 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 337 422 528 664 1051
..MED.	 GNP--MED. POP. 364 520 743 1062 2169
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 391 630 1015 1732 4701
SINGAPORE 1200 LOW GNP-HIGH POP, 1389 1773 2263 2930 4911
MED.	 GNP-MED. POP. 1512 2222 3265 4797 10356
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 1641 2765 4659 7851 22292
SOUTH.VIETNAM 225a LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 228 233 238 246 256
MED.	 GNP-MED. POP. 235 252 270 289 332
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 247 288 336 395 547
OTHER ASIA 269" LOW GNP -HIGH POP. 285 304 324 351 397
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 299 335 375 432 541
HIGH GNP-LOI4 POP. 311 364 428 522 721
CAMBODIA llla LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 96 84 75 64 52
MED.	 GNP-MED. POP. 110 111 112 113 115
HIGH GNP -LOW POP. 121 136 152 173 212
i
PACIFIC BASIN TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER .CAPITA - STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
1975 - 2000
(1972 $ EQUIV.)
COUNTRY 1972 PROJECTION 1975 1980 1985 I990 2000
LAOS 80 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 77 73 73 73 73
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 82 86 90 95 =05
HIGH GNP-LOW POP, 85 94 io4 115 14o
MALAYSIA 457 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 487 554 630 716 926
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 502 599 715 853 1215
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 513 636 789 991 1564
NEW ZEALAND 3359 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 3481 3695 3922 4204 4831
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 3544 3875 4287 4632 5537
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 3607 4061 4572 5173 6622
PHILIPPINES 202 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 212 229 248 269 315
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 214 237 261 289 352
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 220 252 289 332 438
THAILAND 195 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 205 221 240 260 304
MED. GNP-MED.POP. 216 255 301 361 519
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 227 293 377 493 842
ARGENTINA 1095 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 1135 1205 1279 1357 1529MED. GNP-MED. POP. 1183 1345 1529 1738 2247
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 1232 1499 1823 2218 3284
BRAZIL 495 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 522 571 624 682 816
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 535 608 691 7865 1016
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 544 637 746 873 1196
CANADA 4696 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 4867 5166 5484 5821 6558
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 5042 5677 6392 7197 9123
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 5192 6136 7253 x572 12328
CHILE 795 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 809 834 859 885 940
MED, GNP-MED. POP. 837 917 1003 1095 1310
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 874 1023 1197 1402 1920
MEXICO 750 LOW GNP-HIGH PUP, 810 921 1047 1191 1539
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 849 1042 1280 1573 2373
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 898 1214 1639 2215 4042
UNITED STATES 5532 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 5871 6482 1156 7901 9631
MED. GNP-MED. POP. 6045 7008 8124 9418 12657
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 6187 7455 8984 i0825 15718
VENEZUELA 1166 LOW GNP-HIGH POP. 1194 1243 1293 1346 1458
MED. GNP -MED. POP. 1230 1345 1470 1608 1922
HIGH GNP-LOW POP. 1267 1454 1670 1955 2679
4
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AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
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CHINA BLOC TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
SUMMARY
POPULATION (MILLIONS)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
835.61" 909.20 984.82 1o62.06 1149.79 1347.58
923.47 1010.92 1107.88 1214.36 1413.31
924.2; 1022.54 1131.27 1251.40 1531.52
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (BILLIONS 1972 $ EQUIV.)
1970 ADJ 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
126.40 154.10 187.73 228.88 279.14 415.18
169.15 226.42 303.11 406.01 728.48
185.57 272-52 400.13 587.92 1269.28
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA	 ( 1972 $ EQUIV.)
1970 ADJ PROJECTION
	 1975 1980 1985 1994 2010
151.00 LOW GNP-HIGH POP,	 167.00 184.00 202.00 227.00 277.00
VIED GNP--MED POP.	 183.00 224.00 274.00 340 .00 522.00
HIGH GNP-LOW POP.	 2o4.00 277.00 376.00 513.00 982.00
CJI1F'W1tu
c
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CHINA BLOC TRADING AND INVESTMENT AREA
POPULATION - STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(MILLIONS)
GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE
COUNTRY 1970 M 1975 M 1980 M 1985 M 1990 M 2000
CHINA	 (PRC) 800.00" 1.7 869.60 1.6 940.91 1.5 1013.36 1.5 1091.68 I.5 1266.42
2.0 883.20 1.8 965.34 1.8 1056.31 1.5 1137.95 I.5 1320.09
2.0 883.20 2.0 975.20 2.0 io76.8o 2.0 1178.87 2.0 1449.41
NORTH KOREA 13.61"' 2.4 15.31 2.4 17.24 2,4 19.42 2.4 21.86 2.4 27.77
2.5 15.39 2.5 17.42 2.5 19.71 2.5 22.30 2.5 28.55
2.7 15.53 2.7 17.77 2.6 20.19 2.6 22.95 2.6 29.68
NORTH VIETNAM 22.00 24.29 1.9 26.67 1.9 29,28 1.9 32.17 1.9 38.81
2.5 24.88 2.5 28.16 2.5 ' 31.86 2.5 36.05 2.5 46.16
3.0 25.50 3.0 29.57 3.0 34.28 3.0 39 . 74 3.0 53.39
r
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CHINA BLOC
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT -- STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
1975-2000
(BILLIONS - 1972 $ EQUIV.)
COUNTRY
CHINA (PRC)
114ORTH KOREA
i NORTH VIETNAM
GROWTH
RATE
1972 M 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
140.00^ 4.0 157.48 191.6 233.11 283.61 419.82
6.0 166.77 223.14 298.61 399.61 715.64
8.0 176.36 259.13 380.70 559.44 1207.79
.4
4.00 5.5 5.28 6.90 9.02 11.79 20.14
7.0 5.67 7.95 11.15 15.64 30.76
8,5 6.08 9,14 13.74 20.66 46.72
1 .6** 3.0 1.75 2.03 2.35 2.72 3.66
4.0 1.8 2.19 2.66 3.24 4.8
6.0 1.91 2.55 3.41 4.57 8.18
TIMATE
"DOUGLAS PIKE, "NORTH VIETNAM IN 1974,"
VIETNAM BULLETIN, 1 NOV 1974.
CHINA BLOC
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA - STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS
132 L2000
(1972 $ EQUIV.)
COUNTRY 1972 PROJECTION 1975 198o 1985 1990 2000
CHINA	 (PRC)
150..
LO GNP:HI	 POP. 165 182 201 222 269
MED GNP:MED POP. 182 223 272 347 548
HI GNP:LO POP. 203 275 376 528 1045
NORTH KOREA
J.
297* LO GNP:HI	 POP. 340 388 447 518 689
MED GNP:MED POP. 368 456 566 716 1136
HI GNP:LO POP. 397 530 707 982 1821
NORTH VIETNAM
,4165."
LO GNP:HI	 POP. 65 65 65 65 65
MED GNP:MED.	 POP. 68 72 77 83 94
HI GNP:LO POP. 74 92 115 144 223
EUROPE	 f -15
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GNP/GAP, AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS
BY COUNTRY AND REGION - ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
	 1972-2000
GNP FIGURES IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS
COUNTRY/REGION 1972 % 1975 % 1980 % 1985 % 1990 % 2000
W. GERMANY GNP	 (BIL.) 285.6 3.0 312 5.0 398 5.0 508 4.5 633 4.o 937
GNP/CAP. 4213 3.0 4604 4.6 5765 4.6 7219 4.1 8825 3.6 12569
POP.(MIL.) 61 0.5 62 o.4 63 0.4 64 0.4 65 o.4 68
FRANCE GNP 218 3.5 242 6.0 324 5.5 424 5.0 541 5.0 881
GNP/CAP. 4200 3.0 4590 5.2 5915 4.7 7442 4.3 9185 4.3 13995
POP. 52 o.8 536 0.8 55 0.8 57 0.7 59 0.7 63
UNITED GNP 151 2.1 161 4.0 196 4.5 244 4.5 304 4.5 472
KINGDOM GNP/CAP. 2714 2.1 2889 3.4 3415 3.7 4095 3.8 4938 3.9 7235
POP. 56 0.6 57 0.6 59 0.8 61 0.7 63 o.6 67
ITALY GNP 122.1 3.5 135 5.0 172 5.0 220 5.5 288 5.5 492
GNP/CAP. 2246 3.0 2454 4.3 3029 4.3 3739 4.8 4727 4.9 7627
POP. 55 0.8 56 0.7 58 0.7 60 0.7 62 0.6 66
SCANDINAVIA GNP 96 2.5 103 4.o 125 4.5 156 4.5 194 4.5 301
GNP/CAP. 36o0 2.3 3854 3.3 4533 3.9 5489 3.9 6646 4.0 9838
POP. 22 0.7
DEVELOPING NATIONS
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, GNP/CAP, AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS
BY COUNTRY AND REGION - ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
	 1972-2000
GNP FIGURES IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS
COUNTRY/REGION 19Z2 % 1975 % 1980 1985 1990 % 2000
PEOPLE'S. GNP	 (BIL.) loo * 2.0 149 6.o 199 6.o 266 6.o 356 6.0 638
REP.	 OF CHINA GNP/CAP. 150 1.4 156.39 4.4 193.96 4.5 241.71 4.6 302.65 4.8 483.68
POP.(MIL.) 780 1.6 820 1.6 885 1.5 950 1.4 1025 1.2 1150
INDIA GNP 58 3.0 63 5.0 80 5.5 105 6.o 141 7.0 277
GNP/CAP. 98 2.4 105 2.5 119 3.2 139 3.9 168 5.1 276
POP. 565 2.6 610 2.5 690 2.3 775 2.1 86o 1.9 l000
SOUTH AFRICA GNP 21 2.0 22.3 6.0 29.8 6.0 39.9 6.0 53.4 7.0 105
_ GNP/CAP. 891 0.5 504 3.4 1069 3.3 1257 3.4 1486 4.7 2352
1 24 2.5 26 2.6 30 2.7 35 2.6 39 2.3 49
ALGERIA GNP 7 5.0 8.1 5.5 10.6 6.0 14.2 7.0 19.9 7.5 41
GNP/CAP. 469 1.6 520 1.9 571 2.3 640 3.6 704 4.4 1175
POP. 15 3.4 17 3.6 20 3.7 24 3.4 29 3.1 40
ZAIRE GNP 2.3 1.1 2.4 6.o 3.2 6.0 4.3 7.0 6 7.0 11.8
GNP/CAP. 122 1.5 128 3.4 151 3.2 177 4.3 219 4.5 340
POP. 23 2.5 24 2.6 28 2.8-- -- 32
-
2.7 36 2.5 47
"EST I MATE=
I
IUcTB^	 Or T11'.
 ^^^^ IS FOR
ORI^xIN^ X`'	 I I 1
Appendix II
THE PROSPECTS FOR RAW MATERIALS
As a long term trend from 1930 to 1970, world production of raw
materials has increased very markedly. Although U.S. production and
consumption continued to climb after World War II, its share of world
production has dropped precipitously. A curve of steel consumption
showed that the peak of use of this material occurs at roughly $2000
GNP per capita, after which the increment falls off. This indicates
that young economies tend to use steel more intensively than more
mature economies as well as contributing to the explanation of recent
rapid growth of world demand for raw materials.
On a dollar basis, the price of raw materials has roughly doubled
in the last twenty years. This is an annual increase of about 3 percent,
which is roughly the rate of inflation for this period. However, the
largest part of these increases has occurred in the last three years.
This recent development has come about for several reasons. The first
is the readjustment in world currency rates which has taken place since
1971. Furthermore,the world stock of money increased as boom conditions
characterized most of the world's major economies. When we look at some
specific materials, we see a characteristic pattern of price changes
during the last two years. Copper rose fairly stadily from the fall of
1973 and reached a peak in the summer of 1974, after which it has declined
to present levels which are below those of late 1973. Tin prices rose
fairly strongly during the sane period but now have declined from high
levels of the summer of 1974, stabilizing at levels of about 45 percent
above those of the summer of 1973. Zinc prices have followed a similar
pattern, while aluminum rose more gradually, and has now stabilized at
a point around 46 percent above a year ago.
A chart showing the dependence o`. = the United States on various
impacted raw materials should not be misinterpreted; dependence is not
the same as vulnerability. For instance, uranium becomes much more
plentiful as the price increases. Both the price elasticity of supply
a.sd the volume/grade relationships indicate very long range availability
of all significant raw materials.
A series of roadblocks raise serious questions about future U.S.
mineral production. The first is simply a general atmosphere of uncer-
tainty regarding the future. This is complicated by the present squeeze
on capital resources and the inevitable time lag involved in construction
facilities for production of raw materials. Finally, and perhaps most
important, is the lack of government incentives for exploitation of
mineral deposits. We therefore foresee relatively slow development of
This appendix was prepared by Ernest E. Schneider of the Hudson
Institute, based on research by Rudy Ruggles, David Harmon, and others
of the Hudson research staff. A chartbook too long for inclusion in
this report is available on request.
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U.S. supplies and raw materials, with little change likely for the medium
run future. It follows that the U.S. will continue to depend on world
markets for many of its raw materials. At present, high priority is
being given to solving the energy crisis and to complying with environ-
mental regulations.
Stockpiling is the most obvious and apparently the most effective
method of insulating the U.S. against vulnerability of raw materials
supplies. Current and recent policy on stockpiling has been rather
confused. WFether the purpose of stockpiling should be strategic or eco-
nomic has not been clear. Until the Nixon administration introduced some
basic changes in stockpiling, the basic objective has been strategic,
` that is, the mE^'ntenance of a one-year .supply as a buffer against short-
ages during a war time situation. The Nixon administration changed this
objective to one which was basically economic. It transferred authority
for stockpiles from the Office of Emergency Planning to the General
Services Administration, and, in 1973, decided to reduce these stocks
from the level of $6.6 billion to $.7 billion, that is, a 90 percent
drop. The real objective of the change in policy was to use the stock-
piles as a method of combating inflation. Among the most important
arguments in favor of stockpiling raw materials are: 1) a deterrent
against the formation of raw materials cartels, 2) to help American
allies to meet shortages, and 3) to have a buffer stock to permit time
for the development of substitute material. The strongest argument
against stockpiling--that stockpiles should be liquidated to fight
inflation--is, in our view, questionable. 	 It is worth noting that a
consequence of the stockpile liquidation is that it produces a one-
time sort of windfall in government receipts, which helps to bring
down deficits in the Federal budget. At the present time, sentiment
in favor of stockpiling is becoming stronger; for example, a Congres-
sional subcommittee recently reached the conclusion that stockpiles for
only one year were inadequate and favored instead stockpiles for a three
year period.	 If there is some cause for dissatisfaction with American
stockpiling policy, it is only fair to note that no large OECD country
maintains any official raw materials stockpiles. Sweden is the only
example; West Germany and Japan have considered doing so but taken no
action.
The Hudson position is that it is unlikely that new raw materials
cartels will be formed by producing countries on the pattern of OPEC--
although there will be many attempts. if one studies the main raw
materials supplying countries, one finds a pretty clear pattern. They
characteristically are heavily dependent upon sales of a single raw
material, but are only one of several major suppliers of this same
material. The recent and continuing worldwide inflation and the need
to accumulate hard currencies provides, however, a strong impetus for
such countries to try to form cartels in order to protect themselves.
Nevertheless, the great diversity--geographic and political--that exists
among countries which supply a particular material, such as bauxite,
indic-_tes that it would be extremely difficult to form such a cartel
and have it operate effectively. Another impediment is that demand
elasticity for most raw materials is much higher than for oil. Further,
:i
^x-
without the ideological glue which helps to hold OAPEC together, it is
difficult to arrive at the terms on which self-interest should be sacri-
ficed to the interests of the cartel. Hudson Institute does foresee a
trend towards the processing of raw materials to move away from consuming
countries to producing countries. This pattern provides an incentive for
"good behavior" on the part of raw materials producing countries.
So far as raw materials cartels along the lines of OPEC are con-
cerned, we should note that a developed country, Australia, is a member
of the Bauxite producers group (CIPEC). In effect the less developed
areas of developed countries often produce raw materials. In the case
of the tin council, Malaysia is very responsive to price changes. The
United States has recently constructed a large very modern smelter in
Thailand which produces an important by-product. It is interesting to
note that the Peoples Republic of China is now participating in the
Tungsten Committee, put together under the auspices of the United nations.
In general we believe that prices for raw materials have crested
and will probably decline somewhat from recent or present levels. Two
main factors point in this direction. The slackening of the world
economy, of course, brings about a weakening of demand. Meanwhile, high
price levels have introduced Important incentives to build up production
capacity, -which, within a few years, will of course produce increased
supplies, reestablishing a more traditional balance.
Great progress in raw materials production is being made around the
world. The U.S. certainly has no monopoly on finding and developing raw
materials. The characteristics of mineral industries first require a
definition of what is a mineral. In general one could say that it is
some snrt of rr,-wk that is found in the ground. In terms of impact, raw
materials production amounts to 3 or 4 percent of the U.S. GNP but, if
one considers the value added to these raw materials, it is closer to
15 percent.	 It is important to keep an open mind in discussion the
dimensions of U.S. reserves. For one thing, real reserves are often not
reported by producing companies for tax reasons. Furthermore, for some
raw materials one must consider the availability of scrap. In addition,
the need for supplies of various kinds of raw materials varies as tech-
nology develops. For example, the open hearth method of producing steel
depends heavily upon availability of scrap. As this method is phased
out, the demand for iron ore changes. Some other raw materials are truly
non-renewable.
The question of availability of raw materials in this country is
confused by political uncertainties. For example, a much clearer defini-
tion of rights to raw materials is needed. Furthermore, raw materials
in this country are found In land which is both private and government-
owned. We must remember that avery long time lag is usually involved
in the development of hard rock minerals. Price considerations also
play a critical role. For example, lower grade copper can become
available if the price is right, but the availability goes down if an
oversupply develops. Furthermore, costs often rise with higher prices.
Some minerals have very high unit value while others have a very low unit
f	
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value. This consideration has a strong effect upon the practicality of
transporting materials over long distances.
Statistics for 1973 and 1974 give a fairly clear picture of the
present U.S. raw material situation. One can say that the total value
of U.S. raw material production has gone up dramatically while production
levels themselves by volume have declined slightly. Recent price increases
for fuel have, of course, played a major part in this picture. Tables
on the roles of materials in the U.S. economy and on U.S. foreign trade
in raw materials for 1973 and 1974 indicate a general erosion of the U.S.
position; this contrast is mainly a matter of prices. The U.S. deficit
in foreign trade in these materials rose from $8 billion in 1973 to an
estimated $23 billion for 1974, mainly as a result of a huge increase
in the price of crude oil and refined petroleum imports.
In general one can say that U.S. independence in the supply of raw
materials is impossible, and not necessarily desirable. The continental
United States has been thoroughly explored for raw materials by conven-
tional methods. But the adoption of new methods can certainly open new
horizons. So far as processing is concerned, environmental regulations
are causing very serious problems, particularly for smelting operations.
Nevertheless, considerable progress in meeting this problem has been
accomplished in Japan and Germany where the cost of environmental con-
trols is considered as a normal production cost. The current energy
crunch is bringing about some very e'gnificant changes in technology for
raw materials processing. 	 In reality U.S. industry is not very highly
developed technologically in comparison with some foreign countries. For
example, none of our blast furnaces are among the 30 largest in the world.
Japan has much more advanced copper smelters than we do. One reason for
the uneven development of U.S. facilities is the difficulty of writing
off existing plants; this takes about 17 years. Nevertheless, the U.S.
is doing very well, for example, in the development of iron into pellets,
as the very rich iron are reserves in the Midwest have become depleted.
Much newer plants have been constructed in Arizona for the refining of
high grade copper. in zinc we have a very serious smelter problem and
many of them are shut down. The situation in lead is less unfavorable,
largely through the use of scrap. So far as coal is concerned, there is
the question of whether we should exploit our traditional coal mining
supplies in the Western United States. Shortages of raw materials tend
to go in cycles; copper is an example of this phenomenon.
So far as U.S. relations with the rest of the world in raw materials
are concerned, it is obviously safer to depend upon such close neighbors
as Mexico and Canada. It is very clear that we must develop superports
if we are to continue to import large amounts of foreign crude oil.
Massive discoveries of raw materials have occurred abroad and we should
expect that further new discoveries will occur in the rest of the world.
Japan, for example, is turning to South America in its search for raw
materials; one reason is that there has been much less prior exploration
in South America than there has been here. West Germany has been success-
ful in making arrangements which in effect tie up supplies of certain
materials for long periods of time. Although the United States in the
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past has been more interested in making profits than in insuring long
term rights, the U.S. is learning how to follow the German example.
As world trade in raw materials has expanded, so has an international
system for the transport of these materials: Many new techniques have
been adopted for transport. We can anticipate that both the production
and consumption of raw materials will continue to increase outside of
this country. For example, Japan today is among the first three steel
producers in the world. It would be erronE,,us to assume that we are
running out of raw materials. The key need here is for good management
of raw materials supply. In reality, other industrial countries are
more dependent upon foreign raw materials than is the United States.
At present, the less developed countries are suffering more than the
United States in the raw materials market. Communist countries do not
engage in raw materials trade to the extent that t he rest of the world
does. Their costs are more hidden, and shortages and surpluses affect
these countries less than they do the rest of the world.
We can expect that the volume and value of international trade in
raw materials will be very high. For example, Japan depends upon imports
for two thirds of her raw materials, a total of some $35 billion annually,
of which oil represents $17 billion and metals $5 billion. North China
could become a very Important source of raw materials for Japan. Further-
more, we are seeing major developmen r: of offshore areas for raw materials;
for example, the deposits of oil which are being exploited in the North
Sea. Brazil, Australia, and India have important iron ore deposits which
the United States might be interested in importing. High grade copper
deposits are being exploited now in Africa.
In general the importance of U.S. foreign trade in oil and iron ore
is increasing. Our coal is used mainly at home but exports continue,
mainly because of the quality of U.S. coal. The prices of raw materials-
are continuing to skyrocket. In the old days, raw materials played a
rather minor role in U.S. foreign trade. Today, they are a very major
factor indeed. What we need most of all is international cooperation
in raw materials trade.
Institutional changes in raw materials markets are helping to aggra-
vate price swings even beyond what would normally be expected. Raw
materials constitute an important exception to the labor theory of value.
Their price is determined by demand; that is, their prices can go down
even though production costs rise. It was fashionable a few years ago
to engage in spectrum analysis of raw materials, based upon mathematical
formulae. This analysis frequently produced the conclusion that the
higher the price, the greater the demand. In fact, this was tracing a
supply curve, not a demand curve.
Investment in raw-materials futures by non-users and non-suppliers
of raw materials has tended to destabilize markets. The prices of
futures are less a function of the raw materials markets themselves
than of a flow of funds throughout various money markets. (The same
thing is true for the stock market.) Investments of this kind have in
themselves tended to support raw material prices, by causing an inflow
;r
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of speculative funds generally. This situation is complicated by the
fact that such investors are interested in a range of different materials.
For example, they view gold and silver as a part of a general portfolio.
The result is a highly volatile market situation in which developments
in one commodity spill over into a totally different commodity market.
We therefore occasionally see sudden drops or jumps in raw-materials
prices, without any apparent reason. This phenomenon tends to aggravate
price swings.
Theoretically, speculation in futures should dampen price swings
over the long run. But in practice, projections of price trends by
knowledgeable producers for raw materials have often proved to be wrong.
(Copper is an outstanding example.) In general, "experts" expect current
trends to continue indefinitely into the future.
The existence of national and international inventories of raw
materials also can have destabilizing effects on prices. Normally, they
	 1
encourage a tendency to buy when prices are low and sell when prices are
high. But today, Japan is displaying an inclination to panic in both
directions of the price swing: it has bought at high prices, and is
now selling at low prices.
We are also seeing a change in the structure of the business cycle.
Prior to about 1965, construction acted as an internal stabilizer. When
interest rates fell, funds flowed into financial intermediaries and
stimulated mortgage lending and new construction. Thus, as raw-materials
demand fell generally, construction demand rose. Now, the entire economy
tends to move into recession simultaneously. Demand for raw materials
by both industry and housing rises and falls together. For example,
Western Electric buys certain plastics for use in telephones. Their
purchases have been cut by about 60 percent because fewer dwelling units
are being built. The same phenomenon applies to copper, which is used
for wiring and such appliances as air conditioners.
Furthermore, swings in the business cycle are now being aggravated
by international developments. Previously, we had Leen accustomed to
seeing a sort of see-saw movement between the United States and other
developed countries. For 150 years boom conditions in the U.S. tended
to increase costs and push Europe into a recession, and vice versa.
Under present conditions, very close connections exist between the
financial markets of the United States, Europe, and Japan, causing a
parallelism in economic activity. Commodities such as copper and
aluminum are tending to decrease in price under conditions of universal
recession. We can expect that they will go up quite sharply if and when
international business conditions improve (again in phase with one
another).
Quite apart from financial considerations, institutional factors
are influencing raw materials markets. In this country, there is a
tendency for mineral reserves and lands to be taken over by oil companies.
This results from the fact that oil companies acquire rights to the
minerals in broad areas when they are primarily interested in petroleum.
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New techniques are being used. For example, a mercury tracer system
permits companies to explore for various minerals merely by repeated
flights over the territory in question with highly sophisticated instru-
ments. In general, since the 60s, oil companies have been characterized
by high cash flows and high profitability. As energy prices have gone
up, other raw materials prices are tending to decline. We are seeing
something of a recession in exploration and development expenditures as
demand declines.
Long term shifts are occurring in the production costs for raw
materials, which serve as a floor under long-term prices for these
materials. Labor costs have gone up sharply in the last seven or eight
years, following increases in raw materials prices. This tends to have
a sort of a ratchet effect. When prices for raw materials decline,
however, labor costs do not go down accordingly. Capital costs for
raw materials, mining, and processing are also going up. This can be
compensated by increasing the efficiency of the use of capital in mining 	 I
operations. Nevertheless, we are seeing a long term rise in the cost of
such capital per pound of output, particularly as interest rates have
increased. The most important single factor in current operating pro-
duction costs is the sharp increase in energy prices. This is particu-
larly true for such eiectrometals such as copper and aluminum, which
require enormous amounts of electric power for their operation.
Less developed countries have a strong incentive to try to emulate
OPEC in forming producer-cartels to improve their terms of trade. For
example, while Chile has seen the price of her raw material exports go
up, her food imports have risen even more. This provides an impetus for
long term barter agreements. Nevertheless, cartels are not likely to be
very effective in the raw materials area, because demand is a much mare
important factor than supply. if we look at the long term, we see no
evidence that the world is actually running out of raw materials. On
the contrary, new technology tends to outstrip the depletion of resources.
The normal pattern is that the cost of exploiting raw materials becomes
lower as the quality of the ore decreases. High-grade ore tends to be
mined under conditions where labor is used intensively. In more recent
years, we have seen new technology developed so that low-grade ore in
the Western united States is now produced less expensively than high-
grade ore in Africa. The reason is that much less labor is needed in
the American operation.
We can look forward to technological breakthroughs in raw material
exploitation similar to the development of pelletized steel when the
Mesabi range became depleted. Right now, efforts are being made to
develop non--electric modes of reducing aluminum in which a chemical
process is used instead. At present, the price of aluminum is to a
large extent a function of the price of electricity. We may see the
development of copper shifting from copper oxide and sulfide to sulphates.
There is considerable room for economies of scale in the transport of raw
materials. Something like supertankers may be developed which would bring
refineries closer to energy centers.
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It is quite probable that we will see more bilateral arrangements
between countries producing raw materials and those producing energy
products. For example, Iran might make long term deals exchanging
fertilizer for copper from Zaire. In any case, instability in commodity
markets tends to encourage barter arrangements.
There has not been a great deal of opposition by industrial nations
to higher prices of raw materials. We should not expect a sharp upswing
in international trade. The time lag for developing facilities to exploit
raw materials is roughly five years. Thus, we have a rather strong limit
on raw materials supplies over the short run. Demand for raw materials
is not merely a function of rising GNP, We also have volatile money.
affecting these markets very significantly.
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Appendix,II
DISCRETIONARY PERSONAL, ,TRANSPORTATION, AND AIR TRANSPORTATION
INCOME TO THE YEAR 2000
The following tables indicate some of the steps required to project
the amount of money that may be available for personal discretionary air
transportation (i.e,, non-business) travel. The projection is complex,
and much depends on factors such as the possibility of public subsidy of
high-speed rail connections between relatively closely- spaced city-pairs,
such as those in large megalopolitan complexes, like the coastal and
Great lakes "corridors." However, enough has been done here to show that,
on a range of reasonable extrapolations, the U.S. market may grow,
between now and the Year 2000, by a factor of between two and f = ive, in
constant dollars. A "best estimate" would be a factor of three for the
U.S., while . the world market for both business and discretionary air
travel may grow by a factor of ten, as discussed above, from 1975 to 2000.
It is also reasonable to expect air travel prices per seat-mile simul-
taneously to fall, in constant (not current) dollars, as they have in the
past,. because of improved technology and economies of scale. This
scenario could be falsified by a surprisingly cost-distorting rise in
energy prices, which we consider unlikely but not impossible, for reasons
d, -, cussed above.
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DISCRETIONARY PURCHASING POWER AND SPENDING
% of
Aggregate Discretionary Discretionary DPP
Year Purchas_ing_Power Purchasing Power Spending_ Spent
1946 $166.5 $ 69.6 $ 54.5 78.9
1950 222.9 91.5 82.3 90.0
1955 297.9 124.9 107.6 86.2
1960 371.6 143.6 126.6 88.2
1965 508.6 210.4 172.3 81.9
1970 723.9 288.3 240.8 83.9
1971 799.7 328.9 264.0 80.3
1972 884.3 373.7 289.3 77.4
1973	 (est.) 98:1.4 421.2 322.1 76.5
Current U.S. dollars	 - 	 billions
Aggregate Purchas_ing_Power = national income plus increase in credit avail
.,	 _	 _	 -	 _	
able to individuals:
e.g., individual's yearly income	 $10,000
individual BankAmericard
credit level is increased
from $500 to $1,000	 t.	 500
Individual's Total Purchasing Power 	 $10,500
Discretionary purchasing_ Power .= Aggregate purchasing power less:
Essential purchases (food, clothing and
"essential" transportation), fixed commitments
(life insurance premia, tenant rent, interest
component of mortgage payment, homeowner's
taxes), imputed income (employee lodging and
food, lodging and clothing for the military).
and contracted savings (pension plans,
Christmas clubs, etc.)
Discretionary Spending_	 Discretionary purchasing power less savings
Source: Conference Board's time series of "discretionary spending"
Technical Paper #17.
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DISCRETIONARY PURCHASING POWER AND SPENDING - PROJECTIONS
1975 - 2000
Disposable Aggregate Discretionary b Discretionary
Year	 Case	 Personal	 Income	 Purchasing Power s Purchasing Power Spending
1975	 1	 845 930 230 - 370 125 - 335
1 1	 870 955 285 - 380 230 - 340
ill	 895 985 295 - 395 235 - 355
1980	 1	 930 1,025 310	 _ 410 250 - 370
II	 1,010 1,110 335 - 445 270 - 400
111	 1,120 1,230 3.70 - 490 295 - 440
1985	 1.	 1,030 1,135 34o - . 455 270 - 410
11	 1,170 1,285 385 - 515 310 -	 465
111	 1,390 1,530 460 - 610 370 - 550
1990.	1	 1,150 1,265 380 - 505 305 -	 455
11	 1,350 1,485 445 - 595 355 - 535
Ill	 1,775 1,950 535 - 780 470 - 705
2000	 I	 1,375 1,510 455 - 605 365 - 545
11	 1,825 2, 010 605 - 805 485 - 725
III	 2,900 3 ,190. 960 - 1 275. 770 -1150.
1
Constant	 1973 U.S. dollars -	 billions
e
Assumptions
I	 ^
aAggregate purchasing power = 110% of disposable personal	 income due to credit
availability	 to	 individualsb
Disc.retionary.purchasi.ng power =..30- 4.0%.of aggregate pu,rchasing,power .
'Discretionary spending = 80-90% of discretionary purchasing power a
. 1
Source:	 Conference Board
i
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rPERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES
Total and Transportation 1950-1972
Total Transportation 'Purchased
Year Consumption Expenditures:	 User Operated	 Purchased Local Intercity Airlines
1950 S191.0 $ 24.7	 $ 21.9 5 2.8
1955 254.4 35.6	 32.6 3.0
1960 325.2 43.1	 39.8 3.3
1965 .432.8 58.2	 54.4 3.8
1970 617.6 -7.8	 72.3	 2.5 3.0 2.4
1971 667.2 90.4	 84.6	 2.6 3.3 2.7
1972 726.5 100.2	 93.9	 2.6 3.6 3.0
1973. 805.2 109.2	 102.6	 2.6 4.0 3.4
Sources: Statistical	 Abstract of the United States, 1974
U.	 S.	 Department of Commerce, Washington, D.	 C.
Survey of Current Business,	 July 1974
U. ^. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.	 C.
r
T
111--5
DISCRETIONARY TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURES 	 1970--1973
Total
Total Discretionary
Transportation	 User Operated Purchased Transportation
Year Expenditures	 X 0.55 1	Taxicabsz Intercity Expenditures
1970 77.8	 40.0	 .8 3.0 43.8	 7
1971. 90.4	 47,0	 .8 3.3 51.1
1972 100.2	 52.0	 .8 3.6 56.4
1973 109.2	 56.4	 .8 4.0 61.2
Assumptions:	 1 45° of user operated transportation expenditures estimated to
be work related
2Only taxicab portion of total	 purchased	 local	 transportation
assumed to be discretionary
3 Current U.S.	 dollars	 - billions
Source: Conference Board
i
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DISCRETIONARY TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURES
Projections 1975-2000
Disposable Total
c+
Total	 Discretionary
Year	 Case Personal	 Income	 Discretionary Spending Transportation Expenditure
1970 S	 691.7 $240.8 $43.8
1971 746.0 264.0 51.1
1972 802.5 289.3 56.4
1973 903.7 322.1 61.2
1975	 I 845 225-335 45- 70
II 870 230-34o 46-	 71
III 895 235-355 47- 75
1980	 I 930 350-370 50- 81
II 1010 270-400 54- BB
III 1120 295-440 59- 97
1985	 1 1030 270-410 54- 04
11 1170 310-465 62-107
III 1390 370-550 74-127
1990	 1 1150 305-455 61-io9
11 1350 355-535 71-128
111 1775 470-705 94-169.
2000	 1 1375 365-545 73-136
11 1825 485-725 97-181
III 2900 770-1150 154-288
1970. 1973: Current U.S. dollars, billions
1975-2000:	 Constant 1973 U.S. dollars, billions
Assumptions: Total Discretionary Transportation Expenditures:
(a) remains at 20% of Total Discretionary Spending
(b) increases to 25% of Total Discretionary Spending by 2000
